


■ MODERN LIVING

A special seatraders dinner of long tradition in Bremen

To understand what the second Friday in February signifies for the people of Bremen—even for those who have never directly shared in the festivities of that day—it is essential to be well acquainted with the real citizens of the city. On this day merchants and shipowners, associated in the *Haus Seefahrt*, an institution dating back to the Middle Ages, dine together in a meal called the *Schaffermahlzeit*.

The traditional ceremonies are still observed, and even the traditional bill of fare is held in reverence. This is the oldest "fraternal meal" in the world.

The custom originated in farewell festivities held before the port's fleet, icebound over the winter, again set sail for foreign shores with the coming of spring. For centuries the proceeds of the meal have been donated to a charitable foundation providing homes for old people, for the widows of sailors who were lost at sea and for old captains who spent their lives plying the trade routes between Bremen and the ports of the world and have taken leave of the sea forever.

The *Schaffermahlzeit* developed into a formal banquet. Of its former splendour and opulence little has survived besides the original lusty seaman's dishes.

The more recent function of this meal is to give many guests from many parts perhaps their first insight into the activities of merchants whose interests are not centred solely in their own ambitions but who are concerned with the welfare of the entire community within the sturdy dikes. "A small group but of great value," as Tacitus said.

The meal is organised each year by three merchant "Schaffers of the Year" at their own expense. This is considered a great honour. The three are symbolically assisted by three captains. One cannot simply become a host, one must be found worthy to be elected.

Guests who are not associated with the *Haus Seefahrt* are only seen once at this meal. No one can be invited a second time, which gives some indication of what an honour it is to be invited.

Incidentally, it is not just a question of protocol that the citizens of Bremen are also excluded from the meal, unless they have been elected members of the *Haus Seefahrt*. In Bremen, membership of this institution is rated higher than all other honours.

Also officials of this city-state will be looked for in vain when the ceremonially robed members of *Haus Seefahrt* enter the spacious hall of the Old Town Hall after the incantation three times of the summons: *Schaffen, schaffen boven un binnen, binnen und boven schaffen.*

Under the glittering chandeliers of the lofty panelled hall, its walls hung with portraits dating the time of Charlemagne, the huge silver bowls of beer are passed around. Riga plaice, which must be tasted to be believed, recalls the time when Bremen was the Queen of the North and the town of Riga was founded by men from Bremen.

Bremen broccoli melts on the tongue, and the Bordeaux served will be numbered among the choicest wines of the year. In conversation with men whose habitat has been the wide oceans time and distance contract and cast a spell on the listener.

An old captain tells how he started out as a cabin-boy and as mate and officer sailed seven times around the dreaded Horn. Then a hush descends on those present, and the young ones are very still.

Eventually the Dutch clay pipes are filled with aromatic tobacco and when the song of youth that will never return fills the great hall many an eye quietly fills—and it is good when the doors open and a dozen young invited couples from Bremen appear, none of them older than nineteen, according to the rules of the house.

Then the joy of dancing triumphs over the gentle melancholy of age.

(Handelsblatt, 14 February 1969)

Aid to the tourist industry

The Bundestag and the Federal government agree that tourism must be promoted in this country. In a lengthy Bundestag debate, following an interpellation from the Free Democrats, Federal Minister of Economic Affairs Karl Schiller said that this was less a question of government aid than of "initiative, investment and service."

Besides current subsidies, the government has introduced a number of measures to boost tourism, Professor Schiller added. Among these are the planned ten per cent investment grants in underdeveloped areas and along the demarcation line; the regional development programme; and support for local authorithies in their efforts to improve transport communications.

The government also intends to appoint a study group composed of members of several Ministries to examine the problems of the tourist industry. The group will confer with major organisations in this sector. Funds are also to be raised to conduct surveys of the tourist industry.

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 13 February 1969)

Professors are number 1

University professors enjoy the greatest prestige in the Federal Republic, according to a survey conducted by the Emnid Institute in Bielefeld. The question was: "If you had to chose between the director of a large industrial firm, a university professor, a general, a minister, a prince and a bishop, all of the same age and unacquainted with you, on which of them would you bestow an honour if you were asked to do so?"

About 33 per cent chose the professor, twenty the bishop, fourteen the minister, eight the director, six the prince and three per cent the general.

(DIE WELT, 11 February 1969)

Twins born to orang utang in Munich Zoo

Twins have been born to an orang utang in Munich's Hellabrun Zoo. This is something of a zoological sensation since a similar event in Europe has only once before been recorded in Europe and only twice before anywhere else in the world.

The red-haired babies were immediately taken away from the mother, ten-year-old Kessy and taken to an unnamed scientific institute.

The only other orang utang twins born in captivity, in Seattle, America, died immediately after birth.

The twins' parents came from Indonesia where the world's remaining orang utangs are to be found. It is estimated that there are about 3,000 of the species in Borneo and Sumatra.

There are 105 orang utangs in zoos around the world of which 30 were born in captivity.

Federal Republic zoos have committed themselves not to purchase any more of the creatures in a modest attempt to preserve the remaining numbers of the species. For this reason a birth in captivity is something of an event.

The females of the species are not trained to take care of their young as they are when in the jungle.

The head of Munich's Zoo, Dr Heck said: "We hope that the twins survive — a bale and a female. But in any event we shall not bring them back to their mother. They will be brought up just like human children and trained for the kind of life they will lead in the zoo."

The Zoo's administration has asked animal lovers to suggest names for the twins.

(Frankfurter Neue Presse, 21 February 1969)

Confusion

An engineer from Frankenthal in the Palatinate who applied to the registry office in Würzburg in writing for the dates of birth and demise of a man who had died in that town received his letter back with the remark: "Return original. Query cannot be handled without exact specification of dates of birth and decease."

(DIE WELT, 13 February 1969)

The German Tribune

Hamburg, 11 March 1969
Eighth Year - No. 361 - By Air

A WEEKLY REVIEW OF THE GERMAN PRESS

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Nixon came to Europe to listen and learn

Do visits such as President Nixon's alter the course of political events or does any immediate effect vanish into thin air as soon as the bunting is taken down and visitors and hosts return to their desks?

The initial conclusions to be drawn from any attempt to assess the significance of the elements of emotion that can at times play such a major role in politics are encouraging for all concerned.

Since all concerned were equally interested in making Mr Nixon's calls a success this can hardly come as a surprise but let it nonetheless be noted in all gratitude.

The President came to listen and learn, not to teach lessons and push his own point of view. This was due less to moral considerations than to the aim of reducing the destructive effect of the difference in power between nuclear America and its European allies, in so far as this can be done by diplomatic means.

This aim was not based on liberty, equality and fraternity either but is intended more to help bring about a transformation in relations with the Soviet Union from a policy of confrontation to one of negotiation.

President Nixon and his advisers realise that this goal will prove elusive as long as an even closer relationship of trust does not exist between the United States and the countries of Europe.

These closer ties of trust would firstly dissuade Europe from interfering in talks with Moscow and secondly reinforce and provide backing for the United States' negotiation position.

Europe's interest in the success of Mr Nixon's moves lies in the influence to be gained in the dialogue and its possibly further-reaching cousequences. Yet at the same time Europe would not be running the risk of the second-best solution being resorted to in the event of the Nixon plan failing and a dangerous version of negotiation between Washington and Moscow being embarked on regardless of European views.

The anxiety caused in recent years by a policy marked by pressure, obstinacy, pride and arrogance and generative of distrust and a decline in confidence has taught all concerned the lesson President Nixon needed neither to hammer home nor to be taught.

This alone could not admittedly take matters very far. Confidence does not come about merely for reasons of cool calculation and realisation that it is both desirable and necessary.

Even if it is as true of politics as of private life that confidence creates confidence and willingness to meet the other side half-way it is far, far more difficult to do this than to destroy confidence by distrust and so create enmity.

This is where the power of conviction of binding official gestures and personal encounters come into their own. It seems fair to assume that President Nixon has succeeded in lending conviction to the idea that he is seeking and offering Europe a close relationship of trust, constant consultations and genuine give and take for more reasons than that he feels it to be inevitable.

Mr Nixon has also succeeded in convincing Europe that he views reactivation of the North Atlantic alliance by means of more equality in partnership and a greater number of functions as more than just an instrument of American policy, an unfortunate necessity or a sadly unavoidable inroad into the sovereignty of the United States.

President Nixon believes that co-operation within the framework of the Atlantic community will bear fruit and will not be parsimonious with his own contribution. He realises that America stands to gain more from generous solidarity than from petty misgivings and short-sighted isolationist egoism.

Yet even this does not entirely account for the perceptible success of his mission so far. Mr Nixon has also succeeded in confirming the impression gained by Europeans that he has more in common with them in assessing the possible outcome of negotiations with Moscow and the methods that promise success than the previous administration did.

Readiness to make a fresh start with a new kind of co-operation would not have been so prompt had not confidence in the realistic shrewdness of the major partner been there.

Without agreement in the main in judging the situation, its prospects and dangers, hope would not grow that the good intentions proclaimed by every new American administration may have practical repercussions.

It would be wrong to cast the European governments as virgins Nixon is a'wooing. Wherever the President went in Europe he could not fail to sense that Europe is not only prepared but even anxious to strengthen Atlantic ties — and not as the worse of two evils but as a desirable, major good.

Europe too seems to have gained confidence and to be reducing distrust, so healing old American sores of disappointment. There is every reason for satisfaction with the conclusions to be drawn from an interim review.

Bruno Dechamps

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 1 March 1969)

This issue of THE GERMAN TRIBUNE is devoted entirely to President Richard Nixon's visit to Europe. On the evening of 23 February President Nixon was greeted at Brussel's airport by King Baudouin on the first stage of his eight-day tour of European capitals. After visiting Mr Harold Wilson in London the President flew to Bonn on 26 February. The following day he visited West Berlin for a little more than three hours. Mr Nixon returned to Washington on 2 March after visiting General de Gaulle in Paris and the Pope in Rome. The articles reproduced here deal with the highlights of this tour, made so soon after the President assumed office, emphasising his view that he wants to talk to his friends before he negotiates with the West's opponents. Most coverage is given, of course, to the President's visit to Chancellor Kiesinger in Bonn and his trip to West Berlin. His presence in the beleaguered city has given emphasis to the West's determination that the western part of the city shall remain free.



A welcome guest

The President of the United States of America, Richard Milhous Nixon, was given an enthusiastic reception when he arrived in the Federal Republic on 26 February. The population at large greeted the American visitor as a staunch and honoured friend who could be trusted in time of need. His visit was preeminently a talk with allies before negotiating with the other side.

(Photo: AP)

Visit made a lasting and important impact on political attitudes

The great Nixon show seen by audiences of Berliners, Siemens workers and members of the Bundestag in Bonn, is over. It will long live on in the minds and memories of people in this country. In the long run, however, the tremendous impression the new American President has made, in relation to his predecessor, on his political counterparts in Bonn will prove even more important.

A shrewd observer of Richard Nixon's performance at Palais Schaumburg in the Federal capital described the President as a man with clear and firm ideas who is, at the same time, altogether flexible and without fixed ideas.

Bonn's confidence in Nixon is, in fact, mainly based on the format of his views on a dialogue with Moscow about world affairs. Talking with Moscow is President Nixon's main ambition and the concept of negotiations has been thoroughly considered.

Even so, the President has no intention of being negligent enough to negotiate at the expense of his allies, particularly this country, which, he can be fairly sure, will be the main Russian target. Mr Nixon is not prepared to buy a breathing-space for America at the cost of Soviet bombshells lobbed at the Western alliance.

Mr Nixon spoke frankly on this topic in Bonn. He acknowledged that consultation with allied countries in dealing with the Soviet Union made life more difficult but was nonetheless indispensable because there was even more trouble afterwards when there had been no consultation at all (as, for instance, in the case of the non-proliferation treaty).

The President made it clear that he harboured no illusions as to Moscow's motives for wanting to disarm in strategic nuclear weapons. The Kremlin wants to bring developments to a halt in this field, Mr Nixon feels, because it reckons the Soviet Union has more or less drawn level with the United States.

Even at this stage an arms stop is not dismissed as worthless by the US President but it alone is not enough for a man who so strongly advocates freedom from fear of total nuclear war.

Should the Soviet Union refuse to talk, preferring instead to add fuel to the fire in Berlin, to refuse to join the other great powers in guaranteeing the security of all countries in the Middle East, including Israel and to poison relations between America and its allies, as was the case with the non-proliferation treaty, President Nixon will review his policy concept.

Continued on page 2

RESULTS

Nixon visit gives new direction and confidence to foreign policies

STUTTGARTER ZEITUNG

Richard Nixon's visit to this country has put Bonn's foreign policy back on an even keel. Apart from the backing the Federal government has been given at a moment when the Berlin situation has reached crisis level again the foreign policy repercussions of the visit are probably the most significant outcome of the US President's time in Bonn and Berlin.


Following political talks with the new President no one can doubt the outstanding importance of relations with the only one of this country's allies who is powerful enough to guarantee its security even in the face of Soviet power designs.

This should be a matter of course, one could add, but in recent years slightly less importance has been attached to ties with America and these relations were even queried here and there, a state of affairs for which both sides are to blame.

Inadequate consultation during preliminary negotiations on the non-proliferation treaty and the avalanche-like commitments in South-East Asia gave rise in certain quarters here to doubts as to the reliability of the United States as an ally. These worries were, of course, exaggerated but the mere fact of their existence could not fail to have some effect on the importance attached to ties with Washington.

The stage this process of alienation had reached was made particularly clear after the formation of the Bonn Grand Coalition government in December 1966. Newly-elected Chancellor Kiesinger gained extensive approval among the general public when he chose to parley with General de Gaulle immediately but calmly postponed talks in Washington with President Johnson.

At that time keeping a certain distance from the United States was felt to be a shrewd move. Dr Kiesinger's delaying tactics were welcomed as the sign of a new self-awareness and an unsentimental and realistic assessment of this country's interests. It soon enough became clear how little relation this outlook bore to the facts of political life. After the invasion of Czechoslovakia Bonn returned to the fold.



Consultation is all important
(Cartoon: Peter Leger/Hannoversche Presse)

It can only be hoped that President Nixon's visit will mark the end of the period of Federal Republic-American alienation. Certainly, both the person and views of the President on relations between the two countries will have played a large part.

It has been most impressive to see the extent to which Richard Nixon, who prior to his election was something of a controversial figure, succeeded not only in gaining the enthusiastic approval of West Berlin workers but also in winning over a number of experienced politicians who had had reservations about him.

More significant still, certain new notes in President Nixon's foreign policy have laid the groundwork for a reliable relationship of trust between Bonn and Washington. One of these factors has been his decision to visit Europe so soon after inauguration, a decision by which he underlined the priority he gives to his allies in Europe despite the unfinished war in Vietnam.

President Nixon has also made it clear that he intends to make the dialogue with the Soviet Union on world affairs which he, like his predecessors would dearly like to set in motion, dependent on two conditions that are not only in this country's interest but also make the prospects of an agreement with the Soviet Union brighter.

First, he intends to negotiate with the Soviet Union from a position of strength. Unlike General de Gaulle, then, Richard Nixon does not feel that unilateral moves such as a weakening of Nato are a suitable means of detente policy.

Second, he proposes to consult in detail with his allies before any agreement with the Kremlin, a point that robs Moscow of its hopes of splitting the Western camp.

Another measure of importance for this country is President Nixon's declared readiness to use the talks with the Soviet Union on a limitation on both defensive and offensive missiles as a lever to help solve political issues such as an improvement in links between both parts of Germany or in Berlin.

In the circumstances these can as yet be no more than declarations of intent. It could certainly be wrong to imagine that from now on relations between this country and the United States will be entirely free from conflict and problems. Take, for instance, the coupling of disarmament talks and an attempt to solve such persistent political problems as those of divided Germany.

This newspaper's Washington correspondent recently wrote an article about the growing opposition among the American general public to the cost of the arms burden, which is assuming gigantic proportions. The President is certain to be pressed by Congress to brake the arms race on the particularly expensive missile front.

In circumstances such as these President Nixon will not have the easiest of times in gaining support for making an agreement with Moscow dependent on the solution of political issues.

No illusions should be harboured about another aspect of President Nixon's declared policy either. The new President's genuine willingness to consult with his allies in greater detail will flag the more the views he hears from Europe are contradictory and hard to reconcile.

This willingness will, on the other hand, last longer the more European governments succeed in coordinating their political ideas and presenting them to the US President as a consensus of European opinion.

If the Federal government is to ensure that the in itself significant visit of the American President bears the fruit it might it will have to continue its energetic support for the recent efforts to bring about coordination of European policies.

Fritz von Globig
(STUTTGARTER ZEITUNG, 1 March 1969)

Continued from page 1

He made it clear in Bonn that in this country as in the Mediterranean the United States will have to maintain a strong military presence if negotiations are to be successful and that this allies in Europe will have to lend assistance against countries who propose to put the dream of detente into practice by means of troop withdrawals at the most inopportune moment.

Bonn has no choice but to go along with the President's line of thinking and do its bit by making adequate offset payments for the stationing of Allied troop here and by improving Bundeswehr strength.

In other respects President Nixon too is well-prepared for what will be a long, hard climb. Neither Bonn nor London nor Paris will stop him. He should be given every assistance Europe, feeble in comparison, can manage.

Dieter von König
(RHEIN-NECKAR-ZEITUNG, 28 February 1969)

President set out to see Europeans as they really are

Süddeutsche Zeitung

In Brussels President Nixon had three ports of call: the Belgian government, the Common Market and Nato. The third of the three was the most important, and distinguished by a Presidential speech.

After earlier announcements to the contrary the speech has now been published. The intention was obviously to avoid the impression that cooperation between members of the Atlantic alliance is a mass of secrets. Mr Nixon did not in any case propose to deal with detailed aspects of defence. His address was more a policy statement.

In future America intends to pay more attention to the views of fellow-members, who are no doubt glad to hear that consultation is a two-way street. The President referred specifically to the negotiations America proposes to enter into with the Soviet Union.


There can hardly be any objection to President Nixon saying nothing more than that the talks are to take place at a suitable time and after appropriate preparations. Diplomatic projects are not revealed to the world in detail. A hint is sufficient to outline the aim.

The President was optimistic in that he reckoned the era of confrontation was now coming to a close (not over, let it be noted).

The task ahead of Nato, the substitution of unity of joint aims for the erstwhile unity of joint fear, is seen by Mr Nixon too as a sum total of questions, tough questions too, he noted. This is an opportunity for two-way traffic. Relations with Europe are, the President said, to be brought into line with this day and age.

Richard Nixon set out to see the Europeans as they really are and not as the Americans would like to see them. The North Atlantic Council was at least an organised body. On the subsequent stages of his European tour the President came up against a Europe torn by dissent and disunited in a way it has not been for long — as if everyone had gone out of their way to show Europe as it really is.

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 27 February 1969)



The German Tribune

PUBLISHER: Friedrich Reinecke

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF: Eberhard Wagner

ASSISTANT EDITOR-IN-CHIEF: Otto Heinz

ENGLISH LANGUAGE SUB-EDITOR: Geoffrey Penny

GENERAL MANAGER: Heinz Reinecke

Published by: Reinecke Verlag GmbH
23, Schoene Aussicht, Hamburg 22
Tel.: 2-20-12-56 · Telex: 02-14733

Advertising-rates list No. 5



Printed by: Krögers Buch- und Verlagsdruckerei, Hamburg-Blankenese

All articles which THE GERMAN TRIBUNE reprints are published in cooperation with the editorial staffs of leading newspapers of the Federal Republic of Germany. They are complete translations of the original text, in no way abridged or editorially redrafted.

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IN PARIS

President Nixon acknowledges France's special role in European politics

Frankfurter Allgemeine
ZEITUNG FÜR DEUTSCHLAND

Last but not least on his European tour, the American President visited Paris (apart from his visit to the Vatican which was on a different level). When the news of Nixon's imminent trip to Europe was first announced many people, including people in Paris, thought that Nixon would begin his fact-finding tour by visiting the General, especially as after a long period of tension signs of rapprochement had already become evident.

The programme and course of Nixon's stay in Paris confirmed that, though it was his last port of call, it was one of his most important visits. Admittedly, reserve was apparent amidst the conventional pleasantries, the unusually long red carpets and the lengthy discussions.

Complete harmony not achieved

It would be more than premature to assume that complete harmony had been established between Nixon and President de Gaulle on the numerous disputed issues. Mutual reserve was certainly advisable so that tentative initiatives were not upset.

But for many Frenchmen and other Europeans the discussions, which were remarkably long and often went beyond tentative initiatives, opened up prospects of rather more mutual respect and cooperation.

Looking back from the standpoint of the present superficial harmony to the disagreements of recent months and years, it becomes doubly obvious that these disputes were dangerous. There were numerous, blatant gestures of disapproval from the non-appearance at the anniversary of the Normandy landing (1964) to the Vietnam speech in Phnom Penh (1966) and last year's dispute which the Americans felt bound to regard as an attack on the dollar. The dissatisfaction was mutual.

In America during the early part of last year there was talk of boycotting French products. And instead of the cliched ideas and myths — which began with Lafayette — about bonds with the country which an Englishman, the British Foreign Minister Austin Chamberlain, once said he loved "like a woman," other stories were quoted which were intended to serve as warnings against confidence and political investments.

Even though the political deterioration caused by these developments may have been insignificant compared with the verbal fuss, and even though it is repeatedly stated that there can be no doubts as to France's position in the event of a crisis, nevertheless this disagreement was bound to cause serious unrest in the context of certain other disintegration symptoms in Europe.

There can be no doubt that more than anything else the occupation of Czechoslovakia helped to bring about a change of mind. The Soviet Union's action disrupted General de Gaulle's foreign policy concept and though the USA reacted mildly everyone realised how essential the American presence is for the security of Western European nations.

But on the other hand this event demonstrated that as far as the long-term aims of Eastern policy are concerned the differences between the Parisian concept and that of the Americans, the Soviet Union's real opponent in the sphere of power politics, are not as great as has often been claimed. The shock of events in Prague did not dissuade Washington from wanting to reach an understanding with Moscow.

At any rate, as the attitude of the Nixon administration gradually emerged, the stage was set for the renewal of the Franco-American dialogue. Personal factors must also be taken into account: General de Gaulle has a more favourable attitude to Johnson's successor. Nixon was not averse to bringing this fact into play in some of his statements. So this dialogue has now been initiated within the framework of informatory meetings in Europe.

The American President is anxious to know precisely what the French government's attitude is to international problems, and he explicitly stated that he would welcome advice from General de Gaulle, who simply by virtue of his age and his previous activities has more experience than any of Nixon's other European hosts.

The fact that Nixon ended his European tour by going to Paris acknowledges France's special role in European politics.

Of course, this will not alter the fact that America cannot regard any single European power as its only significant partner on the Continent.

America needs Europe in the sense that it cannot afford to have a political vacuum on the other side of the Atlantic. This would arise — one must almost say, has arisen — if Europe were divided up into too many, too small, too weak, too nationalistic states.

Basically this standpoint has held good since the USA began to encourage European cooperation under the Marshall Plan. The sum of the power of these nations, which have long since recovered from the after-effects of the war, is greater than it was than, but not great enough.

Soames affair clouds talks

At this point one comes up against the most important difference of opinion which formed the background to the Nixon-de Gaulle talks in Paris — a background which was further clouded during Nixon's round-trip by the Franco-British diplomatic incident.

The point at issue is the platform from which Europe's power — so impressive in statistical terms, but so feeble in practice — can be brought to bear on all international issues from the Middle to the Far East — or cannot be, as the case may be.

Nikolas Benckiser
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 3 March 1969)

Inter-dependence means mutual dependence

AN IDEA IN COMMON WITH JOHN F. KENNEDY

NRZ NEUE RUHR ZEITUNG
Unabhängige Tageszeitung

During his European tour the President of the United States occasionally used the word inter-dependence. This is probably the only word which Nixon and his former election opponent John F. Kennedy had in common. President Johnson did not know the term.

Inter-dependence means mutual dependence. In this sense, the Atlantic alliance also involves inter-dependence; the partners depend on one another in various ways. If the USA were to return to a policy of isolationism, there would be two inevitable results: the abandonment of Western Europe and self-isolation of America.

President de Gaulle cannot make his anti-Nato moves without causing himself and others unnecessary additional worries at the same time. The Federal Republic cannot reject the Non-proliferation Treaty for reasons concerning home affairs, economic and national security interests without manoeuvring itself into an untenable position on all sides.

But for President Nixon the most problematic aspect of inter-dependence is somewhat different. This is the mutual dependence of American home affairs and American foreign policy on one another. Nixon seems to have realised that this reciprocal relationship will determine the success and significance of his whole term in office.

In brief, Nixon urgently needs an easing of America's foreign policy burden if he is to tackle the most urgent internal problems effectively. The key to everything is money. Johnson's exceedingly ambitious and well-intentioned social programme never really got off the ground because the necessary funds were not forthcoming owing to the 30,000 million dollars taken out of the budget annually to finance the Vietnam War.

The other gigantic item of Washington's public expenditure is the millions of dollars being paid out for an anti-ballistic missile system. This is the prime motive for the desired negotiations between America and Russia. Moscow would also like to forgo this inconceivable, new financial burden. And here lies the common interest — inter-dependence — between the two nuclear super-powers.

If Nixon succeeds in de-escalating the Vietnam War, in appreciably reducing expenditure on America's Asian policy, and secondly if he succeeds in negotiating a limited disarmament or arms restrictions treaty with the Russians, then he will be free to tackle the most urgent domestic issues.

The racial conflict doubtless has emotional and psychological roots. But the really decisive task is achieving economic and social equality between Negroes and Whites.

When he took office President Nixon made no secret of the fact that his political inclinations tended towards foreign policy; in this sphere he is in his element. Consequently he undertook his first foreign policy fact-finding mission unusually soon.

Some people at home were dubious about this decision in view of the numerous difficult issues which the President left behind in Washington. But Nixon's idea seems to be: talks with the Russians as soon as possible, because America's most expensive burdens — Vietnam and anti-ballistic missile systems — can only be eased after an understanding has been reached with Moscow.

Thilo Koch
(NEUE RUHR ZEITUNG, 28 February 1969)

William Rogers, American Secretary of State, President Richard Nixon, Chancellor Kiesinger and Foreign Minister Willy Brandt on the terrace of the Palais Schaumburg in Bonn just after the President's arrival in the Chancellor's official residence.
(Photo: dpa)

POLICY

Talks with friends first - then discussions with opponents

Süddeutsche Zeitung
MÜNCHNER NEUESTE NACHRICHTEN

When the candidates for the American presidency embarked on their election campaigns, one of the battle cries from the Republican camp was that their candidate was a completely different Nixon to the man the American public thought it already knew.

Naturally, opponents who did not want to spoil their image of a manageable yet crafty politician mistrusted the news of the changed Nixon. But in the meantime they themselves have witnessed — first with incredulous amazement and then with measured admiration — the way in which the new President selected his administration with a good deal of discretion and decisiveness.

Today even inveterate doubters say that Nixon is evidently keen to put an end to the old "era of grandiose words" by attacking government business with the professional touch. The question of how deep Nixon's metamorphosis goes is unimportant; the fact is that he does some things in a different manner to what has been normal in Washington hitherto.

One of these differences is that he decided to visit America's allies in Europe as soon as possible after taking office. As he himself said, he wanted to talk to his friends before engaging in discussions with his opponents.

President Johnson was so convinced that he would be able to do business with the Soviet government and simultaneously bring the war in Vietnam to a successful conclusion that he lost sight of his European allies and their worries. Quite apart from the fact that he seemed to be overcome by yawning fits whenever detailed conversation on this aspect of foreign policy arose.

President Nixon seems to understand that his predecessor's attitude, characterised by impatience and desultoriness, was bound to over-cool relations with Europe. Nixon wants to do things differently and attaches importance to the clarifying and binding effect of consultations, as understood by his adviser Henry Kissinger.

And so this "working tour" was organised and it will be beneficial if it sharply creates a new basis of mutual confidence and gives America's allies the feeling that their voice can penetrate to the man in the White House. It was not coincidental that Brussels was the President's first port of call, because the Atlantic alliance as such is in need of confirmation.

Not too much expected

An improvement in the climate of relations would in itself be advantageous but a reiteration of the responsibilities involved in the Atlantic alliance would be even more important. However, apart from this, no striking results should be expected from this trip.

Nixon wants to acquaint himself with the statesmen with whom he will have to deal, and he wants to listen to what they have got to say to him. Actual negotiations will not take place. In a way these consultations are a useful means of occupying the time which Nixon hopes to gain before desirable opportunities arise and then essential decisions have to be made.

To an extent Washington is still resisting the pressure of existing problems which Johnson left unsolved. And in a way the new Defence Minister Laird's trip to Vietnam had a similar function to Nixon's visit to Europe.

A third project must be added to these undertakings which are designed to gain time and this is probably the most important of all, namely investigating the strategic weapons system. This is intended to be the prerequisite for initiating appropriate negotiations with the Soviet Union.

Washington has decided to give up the old pre-condition that political conflicts would have to be overcome before any kind of agreed disarmament. The view now is that inestimable opportunities could be lost if negotiations are delayed until all possible confrontations in the Middle East or anywhere else in the world have been eliminated.

America is, therefore, prepared to negotiate without demanding corresponding political concessions from Moscow. The new Secretary of State, William Rogers, intimated that negotiations might get under way in about six months time.

As these talks are likely to stretch over several years, the question of when they actually begin seems relatively unimportant. But Nixon is just as anxious as Johnson to get things started; presumably this is not only because of the after-effect on the budget and hence on the solution of America's internal problems, but also because of the warning given by Ambassador Thompson on his return from Moscow. Thompson said he thought the dominant majority in the Kremlin, which favours negotiations, had a limited lifespan.

Even given this order of priorities, which attaches more importance to negotiations with the Soviet government on strategic weapons systems than to the Non-proliferation Treaty, the American President's visit could provide allied European governments with a valuable opportunity such as has not been available for almost six years.

If only the European nations had at last learnt to speak with one voice, for example, and if only their organisations were in a position to convince instead of confuse this welcome guest from America. Then President Nixon would probably be prepared to listen to enlightening views or good advice; he is obligingly open-minded whereas in the past others have turned up with ready-made decisions or even faits accomplis.

But what's the use. General de Gaulle has already made it plain what he is not prepared to talk to the President about. He does not want to talk about Europe at all, which he regards as his own prerogative. Some people fear that President de Gaulle will mainly discuss the international currency situation — more than the Middle East or Vietnam — with the intention of pointing out to Nixon that only gold glitters and certainly not the American dollar.

What kind of impression will Nixon get of Europe after his talks in Paris, which are already expected to be "difficult and delicate", or after witnessing the confusion of the Western European Union? How can he react if De Gaulle complains that Britain is still orientated towards American viewpoints or accuses France's five Common Market partners of wanting to create a European, American-orientated cadre within the Atlantic alliance?



The many faces of Europe
(Cartoon: AP)

President Nixon will have a few friendly gestures in store for Bonn: for example, that Washington strictly rejects the Soviet interpretation of the intervention clause in the UN charter, and that America would voluntarily accept inspection of at least part of its atomic energy industry for peaceful purposes in order to soften the blow for the nuclear have-nots.

But in the last analysis even this powerful man will not be able to alter the fact that Bonn can do little without France, let alone in opposition to France. And so one can only comment ruefully that once again Europeans are disgracefully wasting a golden opportunity.

Hermann Proebst
(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 22 February 1969)

Man from the White House attaches prime importance to foreign policy

After one month in office the new American President has his hands full. Right from the start foreign affairs, which in some tricky instances amount to crises, are taking up an enormous proportion of his time.

Richard Nixon is in his element; he takes obvious pleasure in the knowledge that he is now President of the United States with utterly immense possibilities and responsibilities demanding every ounce of energy. He feels well equipped to deal with foreign policy; he has gathered around himself some very promising colleagues.

President Nixon attaches prime importance to foreign policy and this is why he set out on his Western European tour, which started in Brussels on 23 February, so soon. Another reason why Nixon was anxious to inspect the Western alliance is because the perplexities of American home affairs threaten to embrace him with polypoid arms, so to speak; the internal situation is likely to gnaw away his fund of confidence.

His European hosts will hardly give much thought to the fact that this great nation is exhausted by its hopeless involvement in Vietnam, has lost confidence in itself, is at present looking in upon itself and expects its leader to guide it through its own problems, overcome internal conflicts and provide therapy for neurotic tensions.

Even if violence and riots do not occur in the summer, all this will limit Nixon's scope as regards foreign affairs. In other words, Nixon's America needs the Atlantic alliance and vice-versa. If Nato is to continue to function, if it is not to deteriorate still further, then its sluggish circulation must be stimulated.

Nixon can contribute a great deal in this respect — or he could miss the opportunity. His predecessor Johnson, who was never at a loss for words, nevertheless gave Europe the impression that she was being neglected because of America's excessive commitments in South-East Asia, and that in the nuclear complicity between the two super-powers she was only being informed after the event and not invited to participate in preliminary consultations.

So Europe reacted by resorting to nationalist ideas. None of this has done any good to the Western alliance, which was at any rate showing signs of wear and tear after twenty years in existence. What would have happened if the Soviet Union had not helped the alliance to get over its lethargy by occupying Czechoslovakia!

Frankfurter Allgemeine
ZEITUNG FÜR DEUTSCHLAND

Since then Nixon has followed a policy of re-emphasising the alliance with Europe and of seeking European support for negotiations with Moscow and of involving European countries in the responsibilities he faces. This is the significance of his European tour.

But there is no need to see the Johnson-Nixon change-over in dramatic terms. A shift in emphases is likely but not a complete reversal. Under President Nixon, America will still not turn its back on Asia — even if the President is able to settle the Vietnam War soon.

Considerable involvement on the coast of South-East Asia will be maintained during the Nixon administration and the desire to increase contacts with the People's Republic of China will take on more concrete forms. Peking's cancellation of Sino-American ambassadorial discussions which have been held in Warsaw since 1954 is the first annoying setback for Nixon's schedule.

However, America's "return" to Europe should not be taken literally. But the change of emphasis is welcome. Since 1963 when John F. Kennedy visited the European heads of government no American president has undertaken such a tour d'horizon.

Nixon will find the circumstances and the climate altered. Despite statistical fluctuations, continuing prosperity has bolstered Europeans' self-confidence. Here and there anti-American resentment has set in, even in the Federal Republic which for a long time seemed to be completely immune to such tendencies. Nixon had to be prepared for tasteless, coarse displays in the streets of this country.


However, the Federal Republic represents a special case: in view of President de Gaulle's open alienation and the unproductiveness of overtures in Moscow's direction to date, the Federal government will want to fall back on the American aspect of its foreign policy. More than any other European government.

President Nixon can therefore be sure of a friendly reception in Bonn, of this country's willingness to accept American initiatives, and of the Federal Republic's determination to make its own contribution to preserving the Western alliance.

The two most important topics of discussions between President Nixon and Chancellor Kiesinger are East-West relations including the new Berlin syndrome, and the future of Nato including the degree of security which European nations can hope in the 1970s under the American nuclear umbrella.

Other governments which will be affected by Nixon's tour, which began on 23 February at a Brussels military airport, are concerned with different priorities. This applies particularly to General de Gaulle; in fact, on sober reflection, it is difficult to imagine any areas of common ground or even scope for anything more than noncommittal metaphors.

Jürgen Tern
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 21 February 1969)



ARRIVAL

The leader with the West's heaviest responsibilities

The residence on the Rhine looked uninviting and unwelcoming: rain, fog and occasional snow showers. Even the colour television picture was unable to brighten the gloomy scene. (This was the first time that such an occasion had been televised in colour.)

The Federal Cabinet was dressed in sober black as if protocol demanded that a "big show" should be put on. When President Richard Nixon disembarked from the presidential jet Air Force One wearing a light-coloured coat, the contrast was patent. On the one hand provincialism — and on the other hand the man with the heaviest responsibility which the Western world can impose on a single individual.

At least at the Cologne-Bonn airport the 56-year-old President did not draw his hosts' attention to the difference in size of the two countries. A few cheering Federal Republic citizens and — so it seemed — just about all the children from the American colony in Bad Godesberg heard Nixon's friendly words of greeting.

President Nixon even delved into his family history. The patient crowd were touched by his reminder that his mother-in-law was born in this country, and by his expression of admiration for German efficiency. This seemed to promise additional security and was applauded, as was the President's commitment to reunification and the "grand alliance."

But then the Americans decided to play safe. The helicopter trip from the airport direct to the gardens of the Palais Schaumburg, which has been made so many times in the past, was cancelled. The fog over Bonn and the tall office blocks surrounding the Federal Chancellor's official residence were considered to be too great a risk, in the opinion of security officials.

Richard Nixon is the fourth American President to visit the Federal Republic. Dwight D. Eisenhower was the first in August 1959, followed by the triumphal visit of John F. Kennedy in June 1963, and finally Lyndon B. Johnson came to Bonn in April 1967 to attend the funeral of former Federal Chancellor Konrad Adenauer.

Even though the circumstances of visits from the White House in Washington have varied considerably, the subjects dealt with at the political descussions have remained the same in essence. The unproductive quarrels amongst Western European nations, which have accompanied Nixon since he arrived on the old Continent, do not seem to have affected him.

He creates a fresh, self-assured impression. When the Federal Chancellor remarked apologetically that unfortunately at the present time Europe once again presented a very confused picture, the American President commented that the situation was not as bad as all that.

President Nixon had a very tight schedule during his one-day visit to Bonn. After a half-hour talk in the Chancellor's study, attended only by Nixon and Kiesinger and interpretors, the political discussions were continued in the cabinet room and the two Foreign Ministers, William Rogers and Willy Brandt, were also present.

Just to emphasise the provincialism of the Federal Republic capital, the mayors of Bonn and Bad Godesberg presented the American guest with their "Golden Books" for the obligatory visitor's signature. Nixon was lucky not to have to pay his respects to Beuel, on the right bank of the Rhine, and other neighbouring villages in this way.

Shortly before one o'clock, Nixon and Kiesinger walked — despite the overcast weather — from the Palais Schaumburg, the Chancellor's official residence, through the little garden gate leading to the Villa Hammerschmidt, the Federal President's residence.

After a brief conversation with Heinrich Lübke, the small party of political leaders had lunch: lobster, celery soup, breast of pheasant, strawberry mousse and mocca coffee — all light and easily digestible. Twenty-two years ago when Nixon first visited this country in 1947, his hosts in West Berlin, Frankfurt and Essen could not offer him such tempting fare.

Although the time allowed for urgent negotiations was very limited — during the afternoon the two government leaders and their advisers and delegations again met in the Chancellor's office — President Nixon departed from the official programme and paid his respects to the Bundestag. Amidst applause, Bundestag President Kai-Uwe von Hassel welcomed Nixon to the chamber.

President Richard Nixon, accompanied by Chancellor Kiesinger arriving at the Palais Schaumburg in Bonn – the Chancellor's official residence
(Photo: dpa)

The Bundestag showed the American President an honour which has never been paid to any other guest of the Bonn parliament. Nixon was not directed to the diplomats' platform but was shown to an honorary seat in front of the rows of members. After von Hassel's welcoming speech, President Nixon was given the opportunity to reply to the Bundestag and to the people of the Federal Republic.

President Nixon's day in Bonn ended with a dinner in the Chancellor's residence. Apart from Nixon, Kiesinger had invited the Foreign Ministers, the Bonn and Washington ambassadors, several cabinet ministers and prominent parliamentarians to attend.

The friendship and mutual obligation, which the President and Chancellor confirmed in speeches and toasts, was not overshadowed by activities of extra-parliamentary opposition groups in Bonn. The very discreet, but nevertheless comprehensive, security precautions proved superfluous.

The people of the Federal Republic — in contrast to the citizens of Brussels and London, where President Nixon had already been — were extremely disciplined. Admittedly the miserable weather was pretty off-putting.

Eghard Mathitz
(Frankfurter Rundschau, 27 February 1969)

In Europe to get a visa for Moscow

Wherever he goes the new American President induces a good atmosphere. With his broad smile, his frank manner and his uncomplicated appearance, he has no difficulty in inspiring confidence and giving the impression that he himself is benevolence incarnate.

By his very presence he seems to arouse the impression that all the quarrels between Europe and America during recent years were simply a nightmare which one only needs to shake off in order to see the world in a radiant light.

Embarking on this European tour at the beginning of his period in office was a clever move. The new President is still fresh and untried, he still seems uninhibited. The situation offers him a unique chance to adopt the role of someone seeking advice and of a discreet adviser at one and the same time; at this juncture, he is half the boss of the greatest world power and half a man who engages in politics as if it were a serious love affair.

But while Richard Nixon smiles at the cameras, shakes hands with people or claps them on the shoulder, he is making observations and gathering material for his policies. Having been trained in the hardest political school in the world, American home affairs, constant alertness has become second nature to him.

To dismiss President Nixon's European visit as a good will tour would be stupid. He wants to gain first-hand knowledge of the situation in the countries which are America's most important allies. It is not mere curiosity which persuaded Nixon to make this trip.

As an ambitious man he wants to make a serious attempt to establish relations with the other world power, namely the Soviet Union, on a new basis through negotiations. If, in so doing, he does not want to risk losing the confidence of his European allies, he must be sure of European nations' restraint in this great adventure.

An American journalist commented that President Nixon was in Europe to acquire a visa to Moscow. This may be somewhat exaggerated, but in essence it is accurate. If President Nixon thought he needed a Federal Republic signature on his visa, then he would have got it in Bonn on 26 February.

For a long time relations between the USA and the Federal Republic have not been so cordial as they are at present. The decisiveness with which Nixon supported the decision to hold the election for Federal President in West-Berlin and his guarantee of the strength of Nato have both had a beneficial effect.

At last politicians in Bonn have the feeling that they are dealing with an American President who is one the same wavelength as them. Nixon's decisive attitude towards Moscow in fact made it easier for Chancellor Kiesinger and his advisers to say yes to the President's more extensive plans.

If President Nixon intends to initiate negotiations with the Soviet Union during the course of this year on mutual arms restrictions and other tricky problems, then after his visit to Bonn he need not fear a storm of objections and suspicions from this country.

For years Federal Republic politicians in particular have demanded that America as the strongest power in the Western alliance should take its responsibilities seriously. After the President's visit a kind of relief could be sensed in Bonn. Nixon's discussions created the impression that he understands his country's problem: to exercise decisive but tactful leadership in the Western world.

For a moment the petty squabbles between the European nations, which have been occupying governments especially during the last few days, faded into the background. Bonn responded with pleasure to the embraces of the major power, which it has had to thank for so much in the past and compared with the daily wrangling in Europe it would seem that future cooperation with the USA will run much more smoothly.

Wolfgang Wagner
(DER TAGESSPIEGEL, 23 February 1969)

The bringer of glad tidings

On 26 February 1969 in Bonn President Nixon assured Chancellor Kiesinger that the American government would engage in "full consultations with its allies and hence with the Federal Republic." This clarifies Washington's new line.

The American-Soviet policy of co-existence is not to be pursued without regard to the Federal Republic. Due attention will be paid to this country's views, its opinions will be sought and it will be kept fully informed. Judging by certain past experiences, this is good news.

But the Chancellor's assurance to President Nixon that the Federal government "understood" the importance of contacts between the USA and the Soviet Union must be interpreted in conjunction with the Federal Republic view that in essence America's policy cannot change radically. The constraint involved in relations, under the pressure of the nuclear stalemate, is too strong.

Thus Nixon's gratifying willingness to give more weight to the Federal Republic's role in the Western alliance and to give Western Europe as a whole the chance to cooperate with the USA on a partnership basis is in fact only an appeal to common sense.

The echo to this appeal is decisive and Richard Nixon came to Europe to ascertain the outcome himself. It has been generally pretty dissonant. One can but hope that Kiesinger's enumeration of this country's interests was a comforting exception.

([illegible], 27 February 1969)

BONN ARRANGEMENTS

Background to the President's talks with Chancellor Kiesinger

President Richard Nixon and Chancellor Kiesinger had no sooner gone into the study of the Palais Schaumburg when inquisitive reporters became eager genealogists. The President's speech at the Cologne-Bonn airport a short while earlier initiated this sudden interest.

The crowd applauded when Nixon announced that his mother-in-law was born in Germany. The impact of this flattering revelation, especially suited for a German audience, was increased when he added: "The German spirit is just as alive in her as it is in my two daughters."

Surprised by this close blood and intellectual relationship with the family of the "highest representative of the American people" (Kiesinger), reporters unearthed the following facts in the archives: In 1912 Käthe Halberstadt, the wife of an Irish gold-digger, gave birth to a daughter, Patricia Ryan, in a tent in Nevada. Twenty-eight years later Patricia, who was not rich, married a similarly, unendowed lawyer Richard Milhous Nixon.

A touching story which the President has related often enough and on this occasion adapted to suit his German hosts. Helped along by such friendly remarks, the visit of this polite man from Washington to a damp and cold Bonn on 26 February passed off much more pleasantly than expected.

Previous American visitors

At ten o'clock in the morning the TV announcer proudly listed Nixon's predecessors who also visited the Federal Republic — Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson — but added ruefully that Nixon was the first President who had been greeted by snow in Bonn.

The snow also obliged Ministers and State Secretaries who had turned out in hats and coats to wait for the President under cover, and the welcoming speeches were given in a kind of garden pavilion.

As if to contradict the unfriendly mood of the weather, Chancellor Kiesinger piled up his greetings: "You are very welcome ... the whole German people is delighted ... we are especially pleased ... sincerely pleased ... we wish you good fortune and success ...." And the interpreter's words echoed across the misty airport — "happy ... pleased ... glad ... from the bottom of my heart."

Schoolchildren from the second to eighth classes from nearby Cologne-Porz ensured that there was an enthusiastic, waving crowd to greet the President's arrival. One of the 220 schoolchildren presented Nixon with a bouquet and, contrary to protocol, he shook hands with spectators by way of saying thank-you for the pleasant reception.

President Nixon took an initialled, gold-plated biro out of his breast-pocket and the boy's father immediately plunged it into his pocket as if it were a religious relic. Other spectators who wanted to at least have a look at, if not touch, the precious object did not have a chance to do so.

Because of the slight sleet, the police and the President's bodyguard decided to leave the helicopter at the airport and travel to Bonn on the motorway. The order went out in carnival-like police language: land route. In case the presidential plane Air Force One was diverted, fleets of cars were also standing by in Düsseldorf and Frankfurt.

For days the large military helicopter had practised landing on the grass behind the Palais Schaumburg and the ear-splitting noise had almost driven the staff of



the Chancellor's office to distraction — all in vain. The red carpet remained rolled up on the terrace.

Host and guest arrived in Bonn in a motorcade. President Nixon and Chancellor Kiesinger travelled in Nixon's bullet and explosive-proof car, which had been specially flown in, and were preceded by security officials with mud-spattered faces. (The two government leaders did not need to waste time with interpreters as the Chancellor speaks English.)

One policeman was not impressed by the motorcade: "The weather wasn't that bad. Kiesinger went to the airport in the helicopter. And we've used the helicopter when you couldn't see more than twelve feet above the ground."

Of course, the inhabitants of Bonn and Bad Godesberg who usually line the streets when foreign heads of state visit the capital were not prepared for the "land route." It was only in the afternoon that a few waving spectators put in an appearance when President Nixon went by car to the American ambassador's villa in Bad Godesberg, where American presidents always stay for security reasons.

More spectators were in evidence when he drove back to Palais Schaumburg in the evening for dinner. According to protocol, the sixteen guests invited to the dinner corresponded to the strength of the political parties: including four members of each of the Coalition parties, the Christian Democratic and Christian Social Unions (CDU/CSU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD), and two representatives of the opposition, the Free Democratic Party (FDP).

The only problem which the Bonn organisers had to face was the request by the Nixon administration that the visit should be "quite different" from those of his predecessors. In accordance with Nixon's wishes a meeting with prominent Federal Republic personalities was arranged for the afternoon in the Federal President's residence.

For inexplicable reasons the list of people invited to this meeting was guarded like a state secret until midday on Wednesday 26 February. And so Nixon was able to talk to Professor Friedrich Karl von Weizsäcker, Mainz Education Minister Vogel, the chairman of the Federal Republic Confederation of Trade Unions (DGB) Gscheidle, Professor Scheuch (Cologne), the publisher of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* Benckiser and Countess Dönhoff *(Die Zeit)*. The author Heinrich Böll declined the invitation.

President Nixon again displayed his independence when he unexpectedly expressed a desire to pay his respects to the Bundestag. Members of the Bundestag, who had been specially summoned to the chamber per loudspeaker, Cabinet ministers and the Federal state leaders on the Bundesrat bench gave a standing ovation when the American President entered the chamber — interrupting the agricultural debate — and Bundestag President Kai-Uwe von Hassel spoke of the great honour which the Bundestag felt he had bestowed upon them. Nixon gave a skilful reply, commenting that this was the first time he had addressed "any parliament in the world" — including his own — since his election as President.

Before the first round of talks between Nixon and Kiesinger at the Chancellor's office in the morning, the President of the country which Kiesinger — sticking to the family image — engagingly referred to as the "big brother" also appeared in front of television cameras; the cameras were trained on the President as soon as he appeared in public.

And so Chancellor Kiesinger also had the opportunity to be seen on TV by millions of viewers. Standing on the terrace of the Palais Schaumburg in front of President Nixon, who was wearing a bluish grey suit with a blue spotted tie, the Chancellor made an expansive gesture as if he wanted to embrace the whole of the snow-covered park.

Later Nixon, Kiesinger, Lübke and the Cabinet posed for a cosy group photograph in front of the Villa Hammerschmidt, before having lunch — which according to the official programme was called "breakfast." The assembled company ate cold lobster, clear celery soup, breast of pheasant and strawberry mousse accompanied by German wines and champagne.

Wilhelmine Lübke descended the stairs of the Villa Hammerschmidt first, signalling to her husband who, however, was chatting to President Nixon who leant forward smiling several times.

Frau Kiesinger was not so much in the limelight on the occasion of this "most splendid state ceremony since the visit of Queen Elizabeth," to quote *Bild*. On her way by car to the Chancellor's residence she was momentarily stopped by the border police patrolling the area.

After his first talks with Chancellor Kiesinger at the Palais Schaumburg, President Nixon fulfilled the most ardent desire of the mayors of Bonn and Bad Godesberg by signing their "Golden Books." It took a moving plea from the townhalls and an article in a local newspaper which talked of disappointment to get the organisers to arrange for President Nixon to sign the autograph albums, as this ceremony was not part of the official programme.

Afterwards the Chancellor and President walked through a small gate, which is usually locked and only accessible to rabbits, to the official residence of the Federal President Heinrich Lübke.

Munich's police chief Schreiber, who travelled to Bonn specially for the occasion, did not want to miss the opportunity of observing police security measures. His colleague in Bonn, Valentin Portz, proudly showed him what the local force is capable of in this respect. Schreiber rejected outright the suggestion that he was investigating on behalf of the "secret capital," Munich. "Well," he commented modestly, "one must take a look at great examples."

In their own view, the police responsible for looking after the official residence — who are used to coping with all sorts of special occasions — did not consider President Nixon's visit a particular problem. It was stated that only one thousand policemen were on duty in Bonn, whereas two and a half times as many were called out for President John F. Kennedy's visit.

The American guards, whose advance troop had held emergency exercises in Bonn during the previous fortnight and had even kept an eye on the carnival procession for the purpose of observing emotionally excited crowds, therefore took all the more security precautions. The security officials, who look rather fearsome, told their Federal Republic colleagues: "We have already lost one President and one presidential candidate on such occasions. This time we'll shoot first."

This was why Federal Republic politicians had already commented anxiously that left-wing demonstrators, not the visitors, might be in danger. But this applied more to West Berlin than to Bonn. One policeman said nervously and irritably to a colleague: "In Berlin things'll be really bad. Every ten minutes we get a bomb threat. And now we've got to give all the waiters the once-over."

Klaus Rudolf Dreher
(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 27 February 1969)

Programme in Bonn

10.00 am Arrival of President Nixon and his party at the Cologne-Bonn airport. Welcomed by Federal Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, Foreign Affairs Minister Willy Brandt and other distinguished figures. Brief greeting speeches.

10.45 am to 11.30 am Federal Cancellor's first discussions with President *Nixon*. Talks between the two Foreign Ministers.

11.30 am to 12.30 pm Continuation of talks with respective *Foreign Affairs Ministers*, Willy Brandt and William Rogers, and a few colleagues.

12.45 pm President Nixon visits Federal President Heinrich Lübke.

1.00 pm Lunch given by the Federal President.

2.40 pm Drive to the American President's residence.

4.15 pm Continuation of talks as between 11.30 am and 12.30 pm.


5.50 pm Return to President's residence.

6.00 pm to 7.00 pm Conversation with notable Federal Republic figures from industry, the press and the academic world.

8.00 pm Dinner given by the Federal Chancellor in his official residence.



President Richard Nixon with Federal President Heinrich Lübke (right) and his wife (Photo: dpa)



IN THE BUNDESTAG

'Principles and ideals that bind us'

TEXT OF MR NIXON'S SPEECH TO THE BUNDESTAG

Mr President, Mr Chancellor, Your Excellencies, Members of the Parliament,

It is a very great honor for me to appear before this legislative body and to respond to the very generous words of welcome that I have just heard from the presiding officer of this body.

At the outset I regret that I find it necessary to have a translator. I do say though that having heard his translation: he had every word right — every word.

Mr President, you have spoken of some of the great ideals that bind our two nations and our two peoples together. I spoke at the airport this morning of the fact that we in the United States owe so much to our German heritage. And I can speak personally on that point because the grandmother of my two daughters on their mother's side was born in Germany.

I would like to speak of those principles and ideals that will continue to bind us together in the years ahead. First, the great alliance of which we are a part. This alliance is strong today and must be maintained in strength in the years ahead. The success of this alliance is indicated by the fact that in the twenty years it has existed, we have had peace as far as this part of the world is concerned, and every one of the nations in the alliance that was free twenty years ago is free today — including the Free City of Berlin.

We are bound together, too, by the economic factors that two great and productive peoples have produced in our two countries. And we know that a strong and productive German economy is essential for a strong free world economy just as is a strong economy in the United States.

We are bound together, too, by a common *dedication* to the cause of peace, peace not only for ourselves but for all mankind.

And, as we enter what I have described as a period of negotiations with those who have been our opponents, we recognise that for those negotiations to succeed it is essential that we maintain the strength that made negotiations possible.

But having spoken of the bonds of national heritage and background, the alliance of the economic factors of those bonds that bring us together, I would add finally one that is demonstrated by my presence in this chamber today. We believe, both of our countries and our peoples, in representative government, in free and vigorous debate, and in free and vigorous elections. And having just been through the ordeal of an election campaign, I wish all of you well in your campaigns. That, as I am sure you will understand, is the international language of politics being on both sides of the same issue.

And finally, as I stand before this parliamentary body, I realise that we share so many common traditions. It is to me a very moving experience to report to you that since becoming President of the United States, I have not yet had the opportunity to appear before our own Congress, and I have not yet appeared before a legislative body in any other country. In other words, as I stand here today, before this Parliament, this is the first time that I, as President of the United States, have appeared before any legislative body in the whole world. And, Mr President, I will have many honours during the period that I will hold office, but I can assure you that as one who began his political career as a Congressman and served in that post for four years, and who then served in our Senate for two years and then served as Vice-President of the United States and President of the Senate — in the chair where you sit — for eight years that there will be no honour greater than the one I had today to address my fellow-legislators.



(Photo: dpa)

The question of off-set agreements

President Nixon and Chancellor Kiesinger did not have the opportunity to discuss in detail the question of future off-setting agreements in favour of the American balance of payments. In fact, they only touched on this confused, specialised subject. The discussions of the two great statesman on such disputed issues were probably not very comprehensive.

The question of *off-setting foreign* exchange costs has been referred to a technical study group consisting of representatives of both governments. And this group is expected to reach an agreement without wasting time.

It is reported that Washington ambassador Pauls pointed out several times during the past week that an immediate decision on this country's foreign exchange assistance to the USA, unimpeded by petty quibbling, was urgently advisable from the point of view of political opportunism.

This also applies in view of the American Congress which has adopted a strong position vis-à-vis Nixon's government and whose goodwill this country needs. Similarly Federal Defence Minister Schröder, clearly reviewing the American scene, has constantly indicated the expediency of immediate action.

Schröder, who is much more than a mere Defence Minister in his political outlook, is anxious for a reasonable, proportional off-set agreement. With good reason. He is bearing in mind the long-term interests of the Federal Republic.

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 28 February 1969)

Europe's interests guaranteed in future negotiations

In a political resumée of President Nixon's two-day visit to Bonn and West Berlin, politicians in Bonn are emphasising above all the American President's guarantees that the interests of the Western allies including the Federal Republic will be taken into account during the *period of negotiations* — which it is hoped will also involve Moscow — which he *wants to initiate*.

It is being pointed out in Bonn with satisfaction that this assurance also refers to the Federal government's desire for further clarification from the Soviet Union on the interpretation of the enemy state or intervention clauses in the UN charter, in connection with the signing of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.

In the context of the present exchange of diplomatic notes on this issue between Bonn and Moscow, it is thought that this country could rely on American protective aid in the sense of further neutralisation of the relevant clauses.

On Monday evening 24 February a note was handed to the Soviet ambassador in which the Soviet government was asked to amplify its note of 7 February to the effect that, despite the so-called enemy state clauses, the renunciation of pressure, threats and blackmail contained in Article 2 of the UN Charter also applied fully to the Federal Republic.

During the exchange of views between President Nixon, Chancellor Kiesinger and Foreign Affairs Minister Brandt on the question of future discussions between Washington and Moscow about limiting strategic weapons, President Nixon made it clear that he attached great importance to these talks.

The impression is in Bonn that the American President has clearcut, definite ideas on the strategic aims and, from a tactical viewpoint, wants to proceed flexibly. In Nixon's opinion, the desired talks with Moscow should include desputed issues such as Vietnam, the Middle East and the Berlin Question.

According to one of the President's spokesmen, it is not a question of a package deal or a bargain but by observing the reactions of the Soviet Union to talks on these issues, America would gain an indication of Moscow's willingness to negotiate.

When discussing this point both Chancellor Kiesinger and Willy Brandt pointed out that the Berlin Question also involved the problem of relationships between the two parts of this country in the sense of reducing the effects of disunity.

The Americans stressed that East-West negotiations would not be allowed to weaken the Western alliance or the position of the Federal Republic. Even if the American government regards its military presence in Europe as mainly a political and diplomatic measure.

On 26 February a government spokesman pointed out that America's determination to maintain her troop strength in Europe also depended on reciprocal contributions on the part of the European allies.

(STUTTGARTER ZEITUNG, 28 February 1969)

Affirmation of friendship

On his progress through Europe President Richard Nixon used his brief stay in Bonn to woo the confidence of the Old World before going to West Berlin and then to Paris, a port of call which is important for everyone.

Nixon is the first American President to have addressed the Bundestag and in his speech he emphasised that this was the first time he had addressed any parliament since his election. No one in this country will have overlooked the friendly undertones, and very few people will have doubted the sincerity of Nixon's convictions, the integrity of this intentions. This was an American statesman speaking who regards the Germans as more than protégés and allies whom America is forced to support because of the mechanisms of international power politics.

Nixon explained to Chancellor Kiesinger that he stands by West Berlin — irrespective of the Federal Republic decision on the venue for the presidential election — and he was going to the city "without hostile or provocative intentions" but to confirm America's support for West Berlin.

Just as Nixon's affirmation of friendship and loyalty to the Atlantic alliance was unambiguous, so was his announcement that he hoped to enter into negotiations with America's "former opponent", the Soviet Union, about international security.

Nixon emphasised that he would listen to the Allies' views on this point in good time. His assurance that other members of the alliance will be consulted is nothing new, but because of the emphasis, accorded to it, it is a political move.


The President placed considerable stress on his political objective of progressing from confrontation to negotiations with the Soviet Union. And to this end he was wooing trust.

The Federal Republic should grant him this confidence: not only because this country is one of America's allies, but because more than any other European nation it has a national security interest in the stability of peace.

In the "era of negotiations" which Nixon hopes to initiate and which he needs from a political viewpoint, this country's legitimate interests and European interests will have to be borne in mind simultaneously so as to combine the two with American aims on the basis of practical defence policy, the Western alliance and the American security guarantees.

This will not always be easy. But in an atmosphere of mutual confidence, diplomatic complications and political difficulties can be overcome. This would seem to be the deeper meaning of the President's visit.

Lothar Ruehl
(DIE WELT, 27 February 1969)










President Nixon arrived at the Cologne-Bonn airport in the presidential jet Airforce One. He inspected a guard of honour made up from the Bundesmarine (top left). The weather was cold and uninviting, but the enthusiasm of the crowd that had waited many hours for Mr Nixon's arrival made up for this. The President was taken to the Palais Schaumburg by car – security men ruled out helicopter transportation because of the high buildings in Bonn close to the Chancellor's official residence. Chancellor Kiesinger first showed his guest the gardens of the Palais (top right). Ignoring his security men President Nixon plunged into the cheering crowds that lined the route from Bonn to Bad Godesberg, shaking hands with people many of whom were waving the Stars and Stripes (in the middle of the page). During his stay in Bonn President Nixon addressed the Bundestag, the first foreign head of state to do so. He was greeted in the chamber by the president of the Bundestag Kai-Uwe von Hassel (bottom left). On the evening of his arrival President Heinrich Lübke gave a dinner in honour of the American President. Guests included Cabinet Ministers, State Secretaries, ambassadors and members of Mr Nixon's party (bottom right). Whilst Mr Nixon was in the official Federal presidential residence a picture was taken on the terrace (top of page 9). In the picture were, among many other senior government and ex-government officials, President Lübke, talking to Mr Nixon, Wilhelmine Lübke and Foreign Affairs Minister Willy Brandt, next to Chancellor Kiesinger. Ex-Chancellor Ludwig Erhard is immediately to the left of Mr Brandt. On the way to the American legation in Bad Godesberg President Nixon stepped out of his car to shake hands with Americans who had gathered to greet their new President. President Nixon shook hands with a young Negro boy, whose parents are attached to the legation (middle of page 9). On the second day of his visit to the Federal Republic Mr Nixon visited West Berlin accompanied by Chancellor Kiesinger and the governing Mayor of West Berlin, Klaus Schütz. One of his engagements during his Berlin visit included an inspection of a section of the infamous Berlin Wall (picture below). Whilst in Berlin Richard Nixon signed the Golden Book in the Charlottenburg Castle (bottom right).

His talks in Bonn and Berlin ranged over a wide number of topics. At dinner in Bonn the President of the United States was able to discuss informally mutally important questions with Karl Schiller, Economic Affairs Minister and Willy Brandt, Minister for Foreign Affairs (bottom left). Although no precise developments came out of the visit, the American leader made personal contact with officials in the Federal Republic which will undoubtedly mature to even closer co-operation between the two countries.


(Photos dpa 6, AP 4)
















■ BERLIN WELCOME

Triumphal tour round the streets of the divided city

Frankfurter Rundschau
Unabhängige Tageszeitung

Restrained tension was in the air. Would President Nixon leave West Berlin "a changed man," as members of the Extra-Parliamentary Opposition (APO) said he would, or would he leave with the conviction that the majority of the people in Berlin will be behind him when he meets Soviet leaders for talks?

The answer is obvious, although the crowds were smaller than those which greeted John F. Kennedy five years ago, and the gulf between the workers and the students has again widened. President Nixon struck the right note when he told workers in the huge packing hall of the Siemens concern, "Sometimes you are bound to feel very much alone. But always remember that we are with you ... In this sense all the people of the world are truly Berliners." This was President Nixon's reaffirmation of John F. Kennedy's pledge *Ich bin ein Berliner* made to the crowds before the Schöneberg Town Hall.

Mr Nixon himself seemed every minute of the time to be aware of the fact that he needs the confidence of the Berliners if he is to start serious negotiations on a peace settlement in Europe. With the proven routine of an American campaigner he exuded optimism, jumped nimbly on to the roar of his bullet-proof limousine and spread his arms, greeting the people of Berlin.

Self-confidently, without any show of false modesty, the President said that the United States was "never more steadfast and resolute than it is today" in its determination to defend the freedom of West Berlin. He emphasised, however, that he was not saying this in any spirit of defiance or belligerence or false heroism.

"I am simply stating an irrevocable fact of international life," said President Nixon. With one sentence he banished doubts of the integrity of the American commitment in West Berlin, doubts that could be seen on some faces along the street.

The security precautions during the President's visit seemed exaggerated. Where lines of cars are usually parked bumper to bumper a forest of no-stopping signs had been set up. Eight thousand policemen in uniform and civies were on duty. Critical areas had been sealed off. Even in the Siemens factory journalists were admitted through a separate entrance which had been cordoned off from the front square with a fence of boards and wire.

President Nixon was accompanied by the governing mayor of West Berlin, Klaus Schütz, smiling broadly in a way that is usually not expected of him. Unusual warmth also crept into his speech when he assured the President, "In Berlin you are always among friends. I want you to feel at home here."

Mr Nixon took the mayor at his word. Several times he departed from the official protocol, causing much uneasiness among the special agents accompanying him.

Again and again he halted the motorcade and left his limousine to shake the hands of Berliners along the route. Herr Schütz was visibly relieved when the programme came to an end as planned without any unpleasant incidents. The expression on Federal Foreign Minister Willy Brandt's face, very gloomily on arrival, brightened from station to station along the way.

Tumultuous applause greeted the President in the Siemens factory. Chancellor Kiesinger, with a tired smile, received only a token welcome. By inviting the Chancellor and the Vice-Chancellor to fly with him in his blue and white Air Force One, President Nixon implicitely demonstrated that the United States recognise the "higher status" of the affiliation of West Berlin to the Federal Republic.

The West Berlin visit of the President thus acquired a value of its own, for it again staked out the borders between the two world powers and showed that the basis of previous American policy in West Berlin will be maintained under the Nixon Administration. In Berlin only a few minutes were set aside for political discussions, unlike in Bonn where both sides had more time at their disposal.



Cheering crowds more than once halted the American President's motorcade as he progressed through West Berlin on 27 February. Chancellor Kiesinger and governing Mayor Klaus Schütz escorted Mr Nixon.

(Photo: dpa)

In the Berlin Question there seem to be no differences of opinion now between the Federal Government, the West Berlin Senate and the Nixon Administration. Doubts which many Berliners entertained regarding American foreign policy and the haunting feeling that one day the people of Berlin will pay the price for the East-West tug-of-war seem to have been banished entirely by Mr Nixon's presence.

When a youth in the crowd ironically called out, "Sieg Heil!" an older worker upbraided him: "What do you know of what we suffered under that call? You know nothing of it!"

Applause accompanied Mr Nixon on his twenty-mile tour of the city. Only one young worker at the well-prepared ceremony in the packing plant of the Siemens factory dared a hesitant boo and this was immediately swallowed up in the cheers.

For all their firm tone and energy the President's speeches made it clear that he too cannot see a solution in the mere perpetuation of present conditions.

Annamarie Doherr

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 28 February 1969)

Richard Nixon's pledge directed towards the Soviet government

In good American the Berliners and President Nixon told each other that they are "okay." This is more than a noncommital mutual pat on the back, more than an expression of Anglo-Saxon joviality.

Mr Nixon and the people of West Berlin can be satisfied with his visit. With few angry voices raised, the President was greeted along the way with enthusiastic applause, and what politician would not be pleased by that? The people of Berlin were pleased to hear from the President personally the reassurances they need from their most powerful protector in times of tension.

The President's pledge to defend the freedom of West Berlin is not only a reassurance to a harassed population; it not only banished signs of resignation on the part of many, as well as banishing the feeling of isolation and lonliness that Mr Nixon mentioned in his speeches. His pledge is directed more significantly at the Soviet government.

With this government the new American President must negotiate. Mr Nixon expects a long, perhaps very long period of negotiation. He does not seem at all averse to the thought that he may go down in history as a "bargaining president."

Mr Nixon's visit to West Berlin was significant because it paved the way for such talks. It served to stake out the positions. The President committed himself, and for doing so he deserves respect.

He committed himself to the freedom of West Berlin, a pledge which no talks can alter. He also passed on precise information to the Soviet government. The Kremlin can take him at his word.

Logically, this means that if the Soviet government really wants to discuss detente with Mr Nixon, and much indicates that it does, it can hardly use the Berlin Question as a pawn in the diplomatic game — at least not in the sense of undermining the status of West Berlin; in the sense of further isolating the city, increasing the hazards to its freedom. In blunt terms what Mr Nixon told the Russians was: Keep your hands off Berlin!

This is the best thing that could happen to Berliners, although unfortunately it must be noted that only West Berliners are in question. Mr Nixon said that the maintenance of the status quo does not mean that anyone approves of it. Neverless, even if the major round of detente negotiations is opened between Moscow and Washington, an adequate solution to the Berlin problem can hardly be expected, a solution that would change the status quo in a free, Western context amounting to a reunification of kinds with the removal of the Wall, following a unilateral concession of the Eastern side.

If Berlin could move into the lee of politics, leaving matters as they now are with the Western sector free and viable, its interests would perhaps be best served for the time being. A period of stabilising rest is needed because West Berlin is constantly under attack and always on the defensive.


No one wants to experiment in any case, apart from a few professional political experimenters. If Berlin is not to become again the focal point of politics, however, if it is to be saved from various degrees of burnings, it must not allow itself to be provoked by the Eastern side into making experiments.

Such provocations from the Ulbricht regime will not cease for familiar reasons, even if the Soviet and American governments open talks to relax tensions. Transit permits in Berlin, for example, apparently are part of the detente concept, even when, as in the recent prospect of an arrangement, the cloven hoof was always visible.

Having realised this, it would be better not to tax the avowed American commitment with impossible demands. During his visit to West Berlin Mr Nixon banished the spectre of a major Berlin crisis. Now prudent political behaviour must help to surmount the minor crisis and avoid them in future.

Friedrich Herzog

(Frankfurter Neue Presse, 28 February 1969)





Renewed self-confidence

(Cartoon: Ernst Heidemann/Frankfurter Neue Presse)

■ SPEECH

Text of address President Richard Nixon gave to Siemens' workers in West Berlin

Mr Mayor, Mr Chancellor, Mr Vice-Chancellor, Mr Secretary of State, distinguished guests and all of those gathered here in this great productive factory in Berlin.

I first apologize for the fact that we have kept you waiting. But as we came through the city the crowds were so large that we were to keep on our schedule and so the reason we are late is a demonstration of the truth of what the mayor has just said, that the people of Berlin are free and that despite a wall this is one city and one people and one nation.

I saw many signs as we came through the streets of the city, some were in English, most were in German, and the ones in German I, of course, could not understand. But there was one sign that was a combination, that made me feel very much at home. It said "Ha, Ho, He — Nixon is okay".

I first came to this city 22 years ago. At that time most of those that I see here are many of those who were not yet born. And to many who came here then Berlin seemed to be a city without hope and without a future. But the pessimists at that period, over 20 years ago, did not know the people of Berlin. There is no more remarkable story in human history than the creation of this island of freedom and prosperity, of courage and determination, in the centre of post-war Europe. And it is you who have done it. It is you who rebuilt this great city. It is you who have stood the shock of crises. It is you who have kept the faith in yourselves and your Allies. Berlin may look lonely on the map. But it is a vital part of the world that believes in the capacity of man to govern himself with responsibility and to shape this destiny in dignity.

If this is an age of symbols, one of the great symbols of the age is this city, and what you do here is done for free men everywhere throughout the world. You stand for a cause much bigger than yourselves and this is the greatest destiny that a man or a woman can have.

Your will to remain free strengthens the will to freedom of all men, your courage in the face of deliberate and constant challenge fortifies the courage of all those who love liberty.

The presence of an American President in Berlin, following a recent visit by a British Prime Minister, is another kind of symbol. It is a way of demonstrating unmistakably our longstanding commitment to the people of West Berlin.

Richard Nixon acknowledges the applause of Siemens' workers after he spoke to them during his Berlin visit

(Photos: dpa)

Let there be no miscalculation: no unilateral move, no illegal act, no form of pressure from any source will shake the resolve of the Western nations to defend their rightful status as protectors of the people of free Berlin.

All the world admires bravery. There are different kinds of bravery. What is much more difficult, much more rare, is bravery day by day — the steady fortitude that resists remorseless pressures and refuses to permit the slow erosion of liberties. That is the remarkable bravery of the Berliner, and it stands as a shining example to people everywhere throughout the world.

The partnership between our two people was forged back in the dark days of the blockade, when men like Lucius Clay and Ernst Reuter personified our determination to survive as free men. It is appropriate, twenty years after the end of that blockade, that we pay tribute to all who suffered for the ideal of freedom in those days of physical privation and spiritual triumph. And as I viewed the progress of this vital city today, I know that the sacrifice was not in vain.

And to all the people of Berlin today I bring this message from the heart of America: You have justified the support and the commitment of your friends, and as a result no city in the world has more friends — or more devoted friends than has the city of Berlin.

The American responsibility here is derived from the most solemn international agreements. But what we have gone through together in those twenty four years has given those agreements a special meaning. Four presidents before me have held to this principle. And I tell at this time in this place that I, too, hold fast to that principle: Berlin must remain free.

I do not say this in any spirit of bravado or belligerence. I am simply stating an irrevocable fact of international life. Our commitment to the freedom of Berlin has never been more steady, never more firm than it is today. For more than a generation, we have pledged American lives to an ideal and a reality: That Berlin shall be free and that Berlin shall live. For its part, Berlin has remained steadfast.

So have we — and steadfast we shall stay.

No one should doubt the determination of the United States to live up to its obligations. The question before the world is not whether we shall rise to the challenge of defending Berlin — we have already demonstrated that we shall. The question now is how best to end the challenge, and clear the way for a peaceful solution to the problem of a divided Germany.

When we say that we reject any unilateral alteration of the status quo in Berlin we do not mean that we consider the status quo to be satisfactory. Nobody benefits from a stalemate, least of all the people of Berlin.

Let us set behind us the stereotype of Berlin as a "provocation"; let us, all of us, view the situation in Berlin as an invocation, a call to end the tension of a past age here and everywhere.

Our common attitude can best be expressed in a motto of Goethe's: "Without haste but without rest".

Step by step we shall strive together to construct a durable peace. There were times in the past when Berlin had to stand its ground in defiance of powerful forces that threatened to overwhelm it. Your determination in those times of danger demonstrated beyond the shadow of a doubt that threats and coercion could never succeed. By your fortitude you have created conditions which may in time permit another kind of determination — a determination that we shall, by negotiation among governments and reconciliation among men, bring an end to the division of this city, this nation, this continent and this planet.

By your faith in the future, you have inspired renewed faith in the hearts of all men. The men of the past thought in terms of blockades and walls, the men of the future will think in terms of open channels.

The men of the past were trapped in the gray overcast of Cold War. The men of the future, a future toward which we will all work, if only they remember the tragedy and triumph of Berlin, will be free to walk in the warm sunlight of a just peace.

And now one final message from the hearts of the people of America to the people of Berlin. Sometimes you must feel that you are very much alone. But always remember that people who are free and who want to be free around the world are with you. In the sense that the people of Berlin stand for freedom and peace all the people of the world are truly Berliners.

Mr Mayor, Mr Chancellor, Mr Vice-Chancellor, Mr Secretary of State, all of the distinguished guests, that are here in this room, I speak to you at a time, when I have experienced a very moving occasion to travel through this city and I realise again what Berlin means to all the people of the world. We have seen here a Wall. A Wall can divide a city, but a Wall can never divide a people. A Wall can divide physically, but it can not divide Berlin spiritually, because the spirit of freedom that I saw in the faces of thousands of Berliners today, is a spirit, that will continue to survive and that will continue to receive support by those who are free throughout the world.

As I went through the city, too, I realised that those, who have indicated that this city was a dying city, were wrong.

Programme in Berlin:

10.00: Arrival of President Nixon at Tempelhof airport on his three and a half hour visit to West Berlin. Welcoming ceremony, review of an American guard of honour. Departure of motorcade over the Columbiadamm for the Air Bridge Memorial.

10.35: The President lays a wreath at the Air Bridge Memorial, after which Mr Nixon visits the Wall near the Prinzenstrasse — Heinrich-Heine-Strasse transit point.

11.15: Arrival of the motorcade on the Kurfürstendamm via the Breitscheidplatz.

11.25: Arrival at Schloss Charlottenburg. The President signs the Golden Book. Brief private talk with the governing mayor of West Berlin, Klaus Schütz.

12.15 to 12.55: Mr Nixon addresses workers in Siemens factory. Afterwards, the motorcade passes through the Nonnendammallee and the Kurt-Schumacher-Damm on its way to Tegel airport.

13.30: After a brief ceremony, President Nixon departs for Rome.

Because I saw the young faces, the children, the workers, smiling, people who realise that this city does have hope, that it does have a future.

And finally, Mr Mayor, as one who has travelled to many cities in the world and many in the United States, I am somewhat of an expert in looking at crowds and also an expert in the signs that say "Nixon come back" and other signs that say "Nixon go home". But here in Berlin most of the signs, the signs that really have meaning, the expression on the faces of people said "Welcome, we stand with you, we stand for peace, we stand for freedom." And I well recall that, as stated some of the signs, and one in particular seemed to repeat over and over again. It said: "Viel Glück". And so I say to the people of Berlin: Good luck.



Siemens' workers strive to shake the President's hand as a leaves the Berlin plant

THE SCENE

Charlottenburg Castle - where the President was entertained in West Berlin

Frankfurter Allgemeine
ZEITUNG FÜR DEUTSCHLAND

When the cavalcade of cars accompanying President Nixon drove into the courtyard of Charlottenburg Castle a ray of sunlight shone momentarily through the foggy skies of Berlin on the gilt statue of Fortune, the weathercock atop the bronze cupola of the Baroque castle.

There was no wind and Fortune stood still with her arms outstretched in the dance pose given her by Richard Scheibe, the sculptor responsible for the bronze figure cast to replace the old Fortune, destroyed during the war.

Schlüter's cupola, the hallmark of Charlottenburg, was rebuilt after the holocaust of the last war. Down below, in the courtyard between the facade of the castle and the two wings, the cavalcade drove round the statue of the Great Elector on horseback, also the work of Schlüter.

The equestrian statue was removed from its old site on Lange Brücke, near the Berliner Schloss, for safe keeping during the war and sunk in the Tegel Lake from a Spree barge. Subsequently salvaged and restored, it was re-erected in front of Charlottenburg Castle.

Charlottenburg Castle dates back to 1695 when Elector Friedrich III, who six years later had himself crowned King in Prussia at Königsberg, built the castle to the west of Berlin for his second wife, Sophie Charlotte of Hanover. At that time it was still called Schloss Lietzow after a nearby village. Not until after the death of Sophie Charlotte was the castle and the surrounding area named Charlottenburg.

Many famous architects worked on the castle until the middle of the eighteenth century. Nering was succeeded by Knobelsdorff, Eosander, Schinkel, Langhans, Le Nôtre and Lenné.

Sophie Charlotte, a gifted woman with an interest in both the arts and the sciences, gathered a great number of famous men around her, including Leibniz, the philosopher, together with whom she formed what was later to become the Berlin Academy of the Arts.



The man of the hour – Richard Nixon on a car top in a Berlin street, surrounded by cheering crowds. Even the Secret Service men have an un-grim look.
(Photo: AP)

Subsequently other Prussian kings chose to spend much of their time at Charlottenburg. Friedrich the Great spent his early years on the throne here. So did Friedrich Wilhelm III, who tried to recreate the spirit of Marcus Aurelius and the Great Elector, was partial to Charlottenburg. So was Queen Luise, who loved the park and its quiet alleyways.

Friedrich III, father of Kaiser Wilhelm II and Emperor for only 100 days in 1888, spent the last days of his life here at Charlottenburg Castle.

The castle was destroyed in the course of aerial bombardment in 1943 and nearly burnt down. It was rebuilt with the aid of substantial funds largely provided by the Federal government in the post-war years and is now the repository of the cultural traditions that disappeared when the ruins of the Berliner Schloss in the heart of the city were demolished in 1950.

The Golden Gallery, with the finest interior of all Berlin castles, and the Oaken Gallery, in which the reception for President Nixon was held, provide a festive background for chamber concerts and receptions given by the Senate of West Berlin.

Since the war the Orangery has housed any number of art exhibitions and in the broad wings of the castle the Prussian Cultural Foundation has found suitable accommodation for part of Berlin's homeless art treasures.

The Langhans building, which once served as a theatre for the royal ensemble that played Lessing, Schiller and Iffland, now houses the Museum of Prehistory and Early History while the Knobelsdorff wing contains the Museum of Arts and Crafts, formerly called the Schlossmuseum because it was housed in the Berliner Schloss.

Even the two guard-rooms opposite the castle, built by Stüler, house part of the city's art treasures, the collection of antiques and the Egyptological Museum.

An oasis of peace

For a long time the castle and surrounding buildings formed an island in the middle of Charlottenburg, which developed into one of the most densely-populated districts of the city. Even now, while traffic speeds along Spandauer Damm the Baroque formal garden behind the castle, and particularly the adjoining park, are an oasis of peace and quiet for the people of Charlottenburg.

To the north and west, only a matter of houses away, are the S-Bahn, the city's overhead suburban railway, and the new urban autobahn while to the north and northeast a major industrial concern and the densely-populated Siemensstadt area follow.

Yet to the west the park is bordered by a tributary of the Spree and long stretches of waterway. The Schinkelhaus in the park has been restored while the Mausoleum, also designed by Schinkel and hidden away in the park, remained intact together with the sarcophagi of Queen Luise, Friedrich Wilhelm III, Wilhelm I and Empress Augusta.

Brigitte Beer
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 20 February 1969)

Berliners demonstrate that they trust the new American President

DER TAGESSPIEGEL
UNABHÄNGIGE BERLINER MORGENZEITUNG

The President's visit was a great opportunity for West Berlin and a great opportunity for Mr Nixon. The Berliners were given a chance to show that despite the passage of time they still trusted in the previous basis of their existence, the American pledge to defend their freedom. The demonstrated this faith throughout the entire visit of the President in a very personal, relaxed and hearty form when at every station of Mr Nixon's tour their welcome expressed the hoped they place in the President's leadership.

For his part, Mr Nixon invited the people of Berlin to declare themselves. The President is fully aware of the internal tensions in the city. By availing himself of every opportunity to make direct contact with the Berliners, he wanted to know how they really stand with the United States. He wanted to know if this city and its convictions can still represent a pledge of American policy, and he wanted to win over the Berliners as allies when he, at the beginning of his term of office, lays the foundations of his relations with the East.

Each in their own way, the Berliners and President Nixon dipped into major politics. Mr Nixon was given to understand that the old proud spirit of the city is still alive and that it can be employed as a prime factor in the phase of worldwide political negotiations he envisages.

The sincerity of Mr Nixon's worlds on signing the Golden Book can be believed. He said he had an eye for the people he met along his route. This is one of the advantages of the American system. The man with all the strings of power in his hand has "an eye" or a feeling for the realities surrounding him, and he cannot deal with them unless he has assessed them accurately.

President Nixon carefully prepared for the climax of his West Berlin visit, his speech to the workers in Siemens, but in the mood of the hour he also spoke impromptu and did so remarkably well. To his prepared speech he added the comment that the people of Berlin must feel "very much alone" at times, but that on behalf of the American people he wished to say that no disagreement existed over America's commitments to West Berlin.

Mr Nixon's speech had two basic elements. One of them was most strikingly apparent when he remarked soberly that the commitments for the security and freedom of West Berlin were "an irrevocable fact of international life".

This was a cool warning to the Soviet Union. It was from Berlin that the President also help up the offer of negotiations with the Soviet government. He said if this basic condition, one of the fundamentals of world politics, is accepted, the United States is prepared to open negotiations on all international problems.

Mr Nixon used his visit to West Berlin to suggest the limits and possibilities of international talks. After his return to Washington from Berlin and from Europe, he will be responsible for reaffirming these from day to day. The hopes of the people of Berlin are with him.

(DER TAGESSPIEGEL, 28 February 1969)

Confrontation and then negotiation

A period of negotiations must and will succeed the period of confrontation, President Nixon says. Fine as this sounds, he himself well knows how difficult it is to convert this principle into practical politics.

It is particularly difficult in Berlin, where confrontation and negotiations almost invariably merge into an involved tangle.

Richard Nixon's short visit to Berlin was, as he noted, not an appearance in the spirit of false heroism or full of enmity but it was nonetheless an unmistakeable demonstration.

Let no one make the mistake of imagining that pressure of any kind and from any quarter might shake the determination of the Western powers to defend their legal status as protectors of free Berlin, he said.

The US President has turned the tables on the other side and been almost as forthright, though not quite as blatantly so.

In accordance with his principle that there must be negotiations but they must not be undertaken in a weak-kneed fashion, President Nixon nevertheless appealed to the common sense of his listeners in the East when he told workers at the Siemens factory that the stereotyped image of Berlin as a provocation should be put to one side and the situation viewed as a call to action.

The status quo in Berlin must, he reckoned, not be altered unilaterally but this did not mean that in the West's view the city's situation was satisfactory.

Yet the other side also feel the situation in West Berlin to be unsatisfactory, only they want to alter it to their advantage. The West's ideas of an improvement in the status quo in Berlin run in a diagonally opposite direction.

Nowhere, in Europe at least, is it as difficult to reconcile wish and reality. Yet for this very reason the outcome of the present differences of opinion on Berlin could provide clear pointers towards the prospects of further discussion between East and West.

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 28 February 1969)

FROM OVER THE WALL

East Berliners show keen interest in Nixon visit

"Yet we still remain one city!" a slogan ran that was to be seen on countless posters in West Berlin on 13 August 1966, the fifth anniversary of the building of the Berlin Wall. This slogan still holds good, as was borne out by the general feeling in East Berlin on the day of President Nixon's visit.

In the other part of Berlin all the good wishes, thoughts and remembrances of East Berliners are once more directed towards West Berlin, friends in Schöneberg, former work-mates in Wedding and relatives in Neukölln.

Workers in their Treptow local, Communist officials in the bar of Unter den Linden Hotel, students in the refectory of Humboldt University, performers in the TV canteen at Adlershof and the East Berlin taxi-driver who untiringly plied me with superb jokes and observations as he drove round the endless streets of the Eastern half of the city all had one thing in common. Their conversation centred around three topics: President Nixon's visit, the 5 March meeting of the Federal Assembly and the entry-permit talks.

Berliners are the same on both sides of the Wall. They are always wideawake and well-informed and ready day and night to talk about any subject under the sun.

People are people everywhere, we thought as we ran into difficulties with the Berliners in uniform, the men of the People's Army and the People's Police, at the frontier.

Early in the morning we, a group of Western pressmen, had crossed over to East Berlin at the Heinrich-Heine-Strasse checkpoint. Controls were rigorous. We had to empty all our pockets and account for every scrap of paper we had on us. In the end we stood there in our stockinged feet because we were asked to take our shoes off.

It was an hour and a half before we were finally allowed through. When we arrived back at midday the frontier was closed. We had no idea who was responsible — probably the politbureau of the Socialist Unity Party (SED).

For two hours no one was let through in either direction. The queues of private cars and commercial vehicles stretched to Jannowitz-Brücke in the heart of East Berlin.

For us with our up-to-the-minute reports in our briefcases it was a question of coming clean. We went to a first lieutenant of the People's Army and said: "We are Western journalists. We have got to get back to West Berlin to phone through our reports to Hamburg and elsewhere."

The officer, a Berliner in uniform, replied: "I appreciate your problem. I'll see what I can do."

The telephone was kept busy in the guard-room. Higher-ranking officers appeared one after the other in their jeeps: majors, a lieutenant-colonel and finally a colonel. When we were on the point of giving it up as a bad job the colonel tapped the side of his fur cap and said: "I don't know how long the frontier is going to be kept closed either but as far as I am concerned you can cross. Good day, gentlemen."



At Heinrich-Heine-Strasse in Berlin President Nixon, accompanied by Chancellor Kiesinger and governing Mayor Klaus Schütz, climbed into a look-out post from which he could see into the Soviet sector of the divided city. Foreign Minister Willy Brandt can be seen at the far right.
(Photo: dpa)

The countless squaddies all round laughed and one of them shouted after us: "Best wishes to Nixon;" The morale was good. This time, on the way back, the customs check took exactly ninety seconds.

It was Thursday, 27 February. We were standing among a crowd of East Berliners behind the frontier installations at Heinrich-Heine-Strasse. People's policemen had tried in vain with the aid of Alsatians and police dogs on leads to move the onlookers back a quarter of a mile to the next crossroads.

Time and time again, step by step, the East Berliners pressed forwards, right up to the first tank traps.

The loudspeaker vans of the West Berlin police could be heard on the other side: "People of Berlin, the President of the United States will be here in a few minutes."

A little boy beside me said: "Mister, will you lift me up? I want to have a look at the President's black limousine. It's supposed to be a fantastic car, armour-plated and so on."

No one was to be seen at the windows of houses on Heinrich-Heine-Strasse. But suddenly, as if by some unheard command, curtains were drawn at eleven o'clock as President Nixon, Chancellor Kiesinger and Foreign Minister Brandt appeared on the rostrum. Hundreds, thousands of people appeared at their windows.

They gazed as if transfixed at the President. They smiled as they heard the crowds of West Berliners shouting: "Ha, ho, hey, Nixon is OK."

The president spent five minutes at the Wall. Even from the other side he could clearly be made out. When he waved to the East Berliners a few of them waved back, hesitantly, anxiously, one eye on the People's Police who stood to attention, hypnotised, themselves gazing at the suntanned man from the White House. You could hear a pin drop on the Eastern side of the Wall.

Then, equally suddenly, it was all over. On both sides the shrill police sirens and flashing lights of patrol cars came into action. On either side they looked and sounded exactly the same.

The well-groomed chief receptionist at one of the largest hotels in East Berlin, a highly-trained and self-assured man, calmly commented: "Things are happening in Berlin. The Hotel is packed fully. Many Eastern Bloc diplomats and journalists have put in an appearance."

"Maybe," he added, "a new era in the history of the divided city is beginning here and now. Nixon said — I heard it all on the radio — that he was for peace and freedom. So are we here in East Berlin.

"If only there were entry-permits soon so that I can see my old folks who live in West Berlin once again in this life. But while there's life there's hope. You ask me what is going on here; that's my answer. I reckon it holds good for most of us here in the East of the city. That's the general current of opinion, sir."

Ulrich Fritze
(Hamburger Abendblatt, 28 February 1969)

When the President was a young congressman

"One of the most interesting and liveliest cities I have ever seen" was Richard Nixon's opinion of Berlin when he first saw it as a Congressman 22 years ago. Sixteen years later, on 23 July 1963, the ex-Vice President paid the divided three-way city a private visit together with his wife and daughters.

A trip to East Berlin on this second occasion did not turn out as Mr Nixon had expected. He was continually surrounded by East Berlin secret police and journalists and few East Berliners had the opportunity of shaking his hand or exchanging a word or two.

The same evening he accordingly paid a surprise visit to East Berlin, accompanied only by his wife and two acquaintances. Passing through Checkpoint Charlie he and his party jumped into a taxi and sped through the centre of East Berlin unnoticed to eat an evening meal in the Budapest restaurant on Karl-Marx-Allee.

Mr Nixon then sat down at the piano and played the Missouri Waltz in honour of ex-President Truman. The powers that be did not find out and tail their visitor for an hour and a half.

The first US President to visit Berlin was Harry S. Truman, who came to Germany in summer 1945 for the Potsdam Agreement. Eighteen years later, on 26 June 1963, the people of Berlin gave President John F. Kennedy a triumphal reception. A month later he was followed by ex-Vice President Nixon.

On 19 August 1961, six days after the building of the Wall, Vice-President Lyndon B. Johnson visited the city on President Kennedy's behalf, accompanied by General Lucius D. Clay and Ambassador Charles Bohlen. Vice-President Hubert H. Humphrey paid Berlin a visit on 6 April 1967.

(DER TAGESSPIEGEL, 27 February 1969)

■ FISCAL AFFAIRS

International money crises and the United States

President Richard Nixon, who arrived in Bonn on 26 February, said shortly before he left for his European tour that questions involving currency would play an important part in the discussions he would have in the various European capitals he planned to visit.

During the last eighteen months there have been three major currency crises. An objective of any discussions would be how would it be possible to avoid such dangerous incidents in the future, or at the very least limit their impact. It goes without saying, of course, that a presidential visit to Europe will not automatically resolve these difficulties. Fiscal experts from the most important countries concerned have for a long time devoted themselves to a solution of this problem. Nixon's remarks on the subject, however, clarify the great importance that political leaders in the West attribute to questions concerning currency.

This was not always so, particularly in the United States. The Johnson administration following closely the influences of a 'new national economy' which was concerned mainly with national growth and full employment, pushed the currency question into the background, but otherwise let things take their course.

President Johnson did not take action until the balance of payments deficit reached a record level and prices continued to rise. Some success was achieved. For the first time in many years the balance of payments deficit showed a slight surplus in 1968, although this was a solitary occurance and closely connected to just plain good fortune.

It is expected that in the financial year 1968-1969 there will be no deficit, and the Federal Reserve Board has announced a number of credit restrictions to combat inflation.

It is certain that Richard Nixon will not neglect to point out these American efforts, during his European trip, and indicate that he is very much in favour of following a policy that strives for stability. Without any doubt the new American line will have its effects on international discussions concerning monetary matters.

During the past three weeks it has been obvious how keen experts assosiated with international monetary bodies are to discuss fiscal problems.

In Basle the governors of central banks of the Group of Ten have set in operation considerations of new measures that can be applied when a country is subjected to extensive speculation against its currency.

In Paris at the ministerial conference of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) international currency considerations played an important role. And at Brussels the European Commission made public a memorandum dealing with economic and monetary cooperation.

The crisis that beset the French franc last year obviously gave the impetus for the preparation of this memorandum. After the May troubles Paris applied without previous consultation with Brussels four limitations on imports and controls on the export of money. There remained nothing else for the Commission to do but to give these measures its blessing after the event. The Commission now fears that such a precedent could be used in future when another member of the Common Market is troubled with balance of payments difficulties. A recurrence ought to be prevented and indeed this should be effected by an alteration of the regulations in the EEC Treaty concerning 'mutual assistance' to other Common Market nembers.

Article 108 of the present constitution stipulates that aid will be offered by other member countries only when it is obvious that measures to relieve pressure on balance of payments difficulties have been exhausted. The Commission wants to alter this order of things.

Aid should be readily available to a country under pressure and to this end each member nation should pledge itself to provide certain support credits when they are demanded and without investigation. Thereafter further measures would be taken.

The Commission's proposal is that aid should be forthcoming automatically. Similar suggestions have been put forward in the wider fields of international currency reserves, but knotty objections were always raised. The main problem to such a solution was that by using such an automatic credit facility, by applying such an overall arrangement, governments would tend to become lax in matters concerning economics, finances and balance of payments policy.

There is some sense in saying that each application for support should be judged on its own merits, judged as to how much support should be given and how the aid offered should be apportioned among the various nations. Because of the high figures that balance of payments deficits can achieve now it is impossible to agree blindly to keeping promises. Furthermore there are now many organisations able to offer fiscal aid, more than enough it could be said. There is for instance the Ad Hoc Comittee of the Group of Ten, the world-wide network of the Swap agreement, credit support from the Monetary Fund and the general credit agreement.

It is manifest that any automatic currency support in the Common Mark has little chance of becoming effective by the fact that the governors of central banks of the Group of Ten, meeting in Basle, made no mention of such automatic arrangements when referring to balance of payments difficulties.

After repeated checks of the method used until now for fiscal aid they have come to the conclusion that the present system, applied until now, of selective and limited aid, by means of the Ad Hoc agreement should remain in operation.

Automatic support for a currency under pressure was manifestly less likely to be promoted when the Group of Ten set about making the present system more flexible and indeed in such a way that soon the Bank for International Balance of Payments as well as markets for capital financing can participate in this system. This is undoubtedly a step forward because countries subject to such credit limitations are obliged to pursue a policy of high interest rates and thus by their own efforts extract themselves from any balance of payments difficulties they may encounter.

That is what has happened currently in Britain and the United States. For more than a year the American government has done all in its power to pursue the recommended answer to the problem, that is to increase interest rates and thereby improve the balance of payments.

That this policy was ultimately not successful can be seen from the balance of payments figures for 1968. But recently O. Emminger postulated that from the middle of last year "trust in the dollar had been re-established and current budgetary and credit policies would help consolidate this trust".

It this therefore true to say that President Nixon has something positive to offer on his European trip.

It is a good thing that officials managing present international currency policies have to hand a major currency that is worthy of trust.

Hans Roeper
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 25 February 1969)



Enough of this love making - let's get down to business!

(Cartoon: H. E. Köhler/DIE ZEIT)

■ LEG PULLING

Doctor Nixon M.D. goes round the ward



The major issues of the American presidential election campaign in 1968 were the social crisis in the USA, the Vietnam War and America's future relations with the Soviet Union. Europe was *not* an issue. The successful candidate Richard Nixon is well aware of this.

Nonetheless, only two months after moving into the White House he has set aside a week to visit Europe. Why? Nixon, an ordinarily disciplined working man, is acting like a medical specialist who, having been engaged in private practice, is appointed consultant of a hospital.

He first visits the less severe cases in his special field — foreign policy — so as to devote his attention to the really serious cases having increased his self-confidence by successfully treating minor ailments. In any case a crash cure would not help the chronic patients whom he wants to keep an eye on for further diagnosis in the meantime.

Doctor Nixon brought with him a straightforward remedy: increasing the confidence of Europeans in the new consultant by visiting them as soon as possible and engaging in friendly consultations, re-activating relations with General de Gaulle through respectful rapprochement and by eliminating the Franco-British quarrel — which has shaken the foundations of the European hospital since the announcement of President Nixon's visit — with the aim of helping Britain to get *out* of the isolation ward in the joint European sick-bay.

Now Doctor Nixon is somewhat confused. He has not found any nice patients with minor complaints. He has only come across serious cases. The British are gnashing their teeth so much on account of de Gaulle that they are in danger of losing their traditional sang-froid. The Federal Republic has already told the doctor the precise date of its next crisis, 5 March. And from Paris, the last and most important call before Nixon visits the Pope, there are reports of nervous contractions (the Common Market is to remain as it is, or be disbanded altogether) which display several symptoms of delirium tremens.

The new consultant's vexation was evident in Bonn when he told Chancellor Kiesinger that Europe's problems were being distorted and exaggerated, they were not genuine crises. Despite his enthusiasm over Nixon's visit, Kiesinger's vexation was also obvious when he stated that ideas about Europe's future had developed in varying directions, that difficult years lay ahead and that problems must be tackled with a great deal of patience and calmness.

The tacit implication behind these comments was the suggestion that perhaps the President did not yet completely understand the delicate problems facing Europe. And this was a reaction to the similarly unspoken reproach that the Europeans should finally forget their imaginary illnesses.

The President and Chancellor evidently endeavoured to find a joint formula to cope with the dispute over holding the Federal Assembly in West Berlin. Nixon made his name as an anti-Communist, he does not believe in a change of mind on the part of the Communists and he would not think of hauling down the flag in West Berlin.


But now he is President and he wants to avoid confrontations with the Communists and initiate negotiations. And it cannot be easy for him to appreciate the niceties of the Intra-German argument over the Federal Assembly and visas which, if they are not settled quickly, will certainly bring about a crisis which could mess up Nixon's whole concept of a dialogue with Moscow. It is to Nixon's credit that he avoided saying anything which could have aroused suspicions that he wanted to put pressure on Bonn.

Instructive visit

It may seem as if President Nixon has come to Europe too soon and has not achieved what he set out to accomplish. But nevertheless — or for that very reason — it is an important and instructive visit for him.

He has had to recognise that the genuine or imaginary ailments of European nations cannot be cured overnight. This is not to praise the Europeans, but this is the situation. He has had a foretaste of how seriously both sides take the Intra-German dispute and of how his larger political plans could be upset by this internal struggle. Once again, this does not do credit to Europe; this is the position.

Rolf Breitenstein
(Frankfurter Rundschau, 27 February 1969)



A united Europe greets the President of the United States!

(Cartoon: Caro/Rheinische Post)

Leaves from a presidential appointments' book

Day 1: The President arrives in Brussels and right away asks after the state of the Common Market. Feeling in need of strengthening after hearing the answer he takes the opportunity to ask about the state of Nato too. Hearing that it is still in a feeble state the President also feels rough and retires.

Days 2 and 3: The President flies to London where he sees Harold Wilson, who laments De Gaulle's inflexibility and Kiesinger's vacillation. The President would gladly nod understandingly but is afraid that this might be misunderstood in Paris. Since the President likes to have a word with the man on the street on his travels he asks the lift attendant in his hotel what he thinks about America, but the lift attendant is a Scotland Yard man and is not supposed to have any ideas on the subject.

Day 4: The President is welcomed in Bonn by Kiesinger, who tells him all about the state the WEU is in, whereupon he feels in a state himself, having to lunch with President Lübke. At the meal Kiesinger relates his ill-luck as a mediator between Paris and London and asks the President to mediate between him and either Paris or London. This so confuses the President that they do not really get down to talking about the non-proliferation treaty and the cost of stationing troops in Germany, particularly as the requested men in the street, scientists, captains of industry and the like, are outside waiting. The President would also like to see a few students on the street but they are waiting for him in Berlin.

Day 5: The President, obliging type that he is, has taken Kiesinger and Brandt with him to Berlin, where he heads for the Wall too see what improvements have been made to it of late. But because of the disarmament talks with Moscow he has to make do with a very short glance at the Wall. He then sees many Berliners, 20,000 of whom are policemen by profession and 6,000 workers to whom he would have liked to have said "I too am a Berliner" except that Kissinger has deleted this passage from the manuscript.

Day 6: The President flies to Paris via Rome in order to visit a mountain called de Gaulle. The General complains about America's Middle East policy, America's monetary policy, America's Europe policy and about Kiesinger and Wilson too. The President would gladly shake his head in sympathy but this might be misunderstood in Paris. The President says only that he would like to hear Europe speak with one voice, to which de Gaulle replies that he is hearing it, which leaves the President speechless.

Day 8: The President flies to Rome again to visit the Pope. He has a question about the Pill on his lips but bravely swallows it. That evening he returns to America feeling most relieved. In comparison with what he has just behind him the problems that await him at home — the Vietnam war, racial troubles and anti-missile systems — are minor details.

Wolfgang Ebert
(DIE ZEIT, 28 February 1969)

Aden	SA $ 0.05	Colombia	col. $ 1.—	Formosa	NT $ 5.—	Indonesia	Rp. 15.—	Malawi	11 d	Paraguay	G 15.—	Sudan	PT 5.—
Afghanistan	Af 10.—	Congo (Brazzaville)	F.C.F.A. 30.—	France	FF 0.60	Iran	Rl 10.—	Malaysia	M. $ 0.40	Peru	S. 3.50	Syria	£ S 0.50
Algeria	DA 0.60	Congo (Kinshasa)	Makuta 7.—	Gabon	F.C.F.A. 30.—	Iraq	50 fils	Mali	FM 60.—	Philippines	P. phil 0.60	Tanzania	EAs 0.25
Angola	Esc 1.—	Costa Rica	C 0.85	Gambia	11 d	Ireland	11 d	Mexico	$ 1.50	Poland	Zl. 0.50	Thailand	B 3.—
Argentina	$ m n 45.—	Cuba	P 0.13	Germany	DM 1.—	Israel	I £ 0.40	Morocco	DM —.65	Portugal	Esc. 1.—	Trinidad and Tobago	BWI $ 0.20
Australia	10 c.	Cyprus	11 d	Ghana	cedi 0.12	Italy	Lir. 80	Mozambique	Esc. 1.—	Rhodesia	11 d	Togo	F.C.F.A. 30.—
Austria	S 3.—	Czechoslovakia	Kcs 0.50	Great Britain	11 d	Ivory Coast	F.C.F.A. 30.—	Nepal	Mohur 1.—	Ruanda	F. Rw 12.—	Turkey	T £ 1.25
Belgium	bfr 6.—	Dahomey	F.C.F.A. 30.—	Greece	Dr 4.—	Jamaica	11 d	Netherlands	Hfl 0.50	Rumania	Leu 0.50	Tunisia	65 M
Bolivia	$ b 1.50	Denmark	dkr 0.90	Guatemala	Q 0.15	Japan	Yen 50	Netherlands Antilles	G ant 0.25	Saudi Arabia	RL 0.60	Uganda	EAs 0.25
Brazil	N. Cr. $ 0.35	Dom. Rep.	RD $ 0.15	Guayana	BWI $ 0.20	Jordan	50 fils	New Zealand	9 c.	Sweden	skr 0.60	UAR	PT 5.—
Bulgaria	Lev 0.05	Ecuador	S 2.50	Guinea	F.G. 30.—	Kenya	EAs 0.25	Nicaragua	C 0.65	Switzerland	FS 0.50	Uruguay	P 20.—
Burma	K 0.60	El Salvador	C 0.30	Haiti	G 0.65	Kuwait	50 fils	Niger	F.C.F.A. 30.—	Senegal	F.C.F.A. 30.—	USA	$ 0.20
Burundi	F. Bu. 10.—	Ethiopia	Eth. $ 0.30	Honduras (Br.)	$ BH 0.20	Laos	Kip 60.—	Nigeria	11 d	Sierra Leone	Le 0.10	USSR	Rbl 0.10
Cambodia	R 4.20	Fiji	11 d	Honduras	L 0.25	Lebanon	P 40.—	Norway	nkr 0.90	Somalia	Sh So 0.90	Venezuela	B 0.60
Cameroun	F.C.F.A. 30.—	Finland	fmk 0.50	Hong Kong	HK $ 0.70	Liberia	Lib $ 0.15	Pakistan	Rs 0.60	South Africa	Rand 0.10	Yugoslavia	Din 1.—
Canada	Can. $ —.20			Hungary	Ft. 1.—	Libya	50 Mills	Panama	B 0.15	South Korea	Won 35.—	Zambia	11 d
Ceylon	cR —.80			Iceland	Kr 5.—	Luxembourg	lfr 6			S. Viet Nam	V.N $ 15.—		
Chile	Esc. 0.60			India	Rs 0.80	Madagascar	FM 30.—			Spain	Pts 8.—		